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Abstract This essay reconstructs Percy Shelley’s theory of mind from his letters 
and many unfinished essays as well as his Defence of Poetry (1821), emphasizing his 
radical insistence on the formal and teleological roles of analogy in human cogni-
tion, communication, and culture. Adopting the assumptions, method, and termi-
nology he inherited from the vigorous associationist tradition in eighteenth-century 
British philosophy and psychology, Shelley sought to demonstrate the innate and 
thus indefeasible foundations of human morality, especially its master principle of 
social equity. His analysis took him at once to the heart of a range of psychoso-
cial issues that are today studied under the cognitive scientific rubric of “theory of 
mind,” including the developmental interrelations of, and motivations for, social 
imitation, language acquisition, and mental representation. Taking first a historical 
and then a theoretical view, I argue that Shelley’s elegant solution to one of the 
major philosophical problems of the empirical age remains surprisingly relevant to 
central issues in contemporary science of mind.
Associationist Moral Psychology as Theory of Mind:  
Recovering Shelley’s Analogy
Though he was there only a term and a half, Percy Shelley (1792–1822) 
received at Oxford an intellectual stimulus to which he responded for the 
remainder of his precocious and sadly arrested career. The stimulant was 
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his first-term reading of British metaphysical and moral philosophy, in 
particular John Locke’s An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) and 
David Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political (1741–42). Together with his class-
mate and friend Thomas Jefferson Hogg, Shelley (1965, 5:300, 8:137) “pre-
pared careful analyses” of these works that he intended to use as a foun-
dation for a series of his own “moral and metaphysical essays,” beginning 
with “the small metaphysical essay in support of Atheism” that resulted 
in their joint expulsion from the university in March 1811. In the ensu-
ing decade, Shelley returned again and again to his philosophical project 
and to the arguments of Locke, Hume, George Berkeley, David Hartley, 
and other leading names in the new “experimental” science of mind. The 
problem at which he labored was precisely the relation between metaphysi-
cal and moral philosophy, especially if one proceeded with “the strictest” 
explanatory “materialism” (i.e., Locke’s simple ideas, passively received 
from experience) and yet aimed to show that a psychological system so 
grounded could—indeed must necessarily—produce “the loftiest” moral 
“disinterestedness” (ibid., 9:12). Shelley wished to derive the cooperative 
or sociomoral impulses from the elemental “organization” of human being, 
and his solution was to reinterpret foundational concepts of empirical psy-
chology such as passion, association, and especially analogy in radical and 
teleological terms, such that an orientation toward others would be no less 
natural than an orientation toward the self. Grounding “the true and the 
beautiful, in a word, the good” in “the relation, subsisting, first between 
existence and perception, and secondly between perception and expres-
sion” (ibid., 7:111–12), Shelley sought to universalize morality and thus 
to rescue it from what appeared to be the accidental logic of association. 
Given normal development and environmental support, the analogical 
architecture of human perception and expression would guarantee human 
morality and predict its cultural-historical augmentation.
 Shelley’s radical solution to the problem of associationist moral psy-
chology is fascinating in its own moment and may remain instructive to 
ours. As Alan Richardson (2001: 184) suggests in his pathbreaking study of 
1. Shelley’s letters (e.g., 1965, 9:10, 33, 36) indicate that he owned the major works of all of 
these figures as part of his personal library.
2. Locke’s (1961 [1690], 1:188) use of the term experiment makes clear its etymological con-
nection to experience (cf. French expérience): “The difference of intention and remission of the 
mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near mind-
ing nothing at all, everyone, I think, has experimented in himself.” The method of “experi-
menting within the self ” is of course introspection, which is the experiential or empirical 
method upon which Locke proceeds and which is, Locke (ibid.: 60) believes, replicable and 
verifiable by any “unprejudiced” reader: “All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on 
is that I can only appeal to men’s own unprejudiced experience and observation whether they 
be true or no.”
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Romantic mind science, “Uncovering some of the hypotheses and connec-
tions made in the past . . . might provoke new questions for scientific inves-
tigation in the present.” Richardson (ibid.) observes, for example, that 
“links between facial expression, non-verbal communication, and what is 
now called ‘theory of mind’—the human ability to model the intentions, 
emotions, and mental dispositions of other human agents—theorized by 
[Charles] Bell, [Thomas] Reid, and [ Joanna and Matthew] Baillie have 
recently been proposed anew.” This essay will confirm Richardson’s point 
by supplementing it with further evidence from the associationist tradition, 
as articulated by the canonical figures (Locke, Hume, Hartley) who shaped 
and provoked Shelley’s thought, and here too the analysis will reveal 
remarkable correspondences with, and thus potential implications for, 
contemporary theory of mind research. In particular, retracing Shelley’s 
route through associationist epistemology and psychology will urge our 
(re)consideration of the empirical hypothesis of deep structural connec-
tions between such cognitive phenomena as analogy, imitation, language, 
representation, and theory of mind. In Shelley’s view, as reconstructed 
from his unfinished essays “On Life,” “On Love,” “A Discourse on the 
Manners of the Ancients, relative to the Subject of Love,” “Speculations 
on Metaphysics,” and “Speculations on Morals,” as well as the culmination 
of all of these, his chef d’oeuvre A Defence of Poetry (1821), such domains are 
better understood as being each a developmental precondition for the next 
in the ontogeny and phylogeny of human social cognition and purpose.
 For efficiency’s sake, I will conduct this argument in the (pre)history and 
theory of cognitive science under exactly those heads, giving the empirical 
historical background first, the cognitive theoretical implications there-
after. And for the sake of clarity, I’ll use footnotes in each section to pro-
vide a “paratext” in the alternative language: thus in the historical section, 
parallels in contemporary cognitive theory will be noted, whereas in the 
theoretical section, parallels from the empirical tradition will be noted. 
This will help keep straight who exactly claimed what and when, avoid-
ing anachronism without thereby sacrificing the real interest and possible 
fruitfulness of immediate juxtaposition and comparison.
1. Radical Empiricism: The Theory of the Analogical Mind
The problem with Lockean association in its original formulation and vari-
ous permutations throughout the eighteenth century was that, in refram-
3. Bruhn (forthcoming) pursues this idea in terms of the possible theoretical and experimen-
tal implications of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s and William Wordsworth’s poetics for what is 
today known as “conceptual integration” or “blending” theory.
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ing questions of speculative and practical philosophy in experiential and 
inductive terms, the theory of association threatened to rob morality of 
any innate foundation or developmental certainty. Because simple ideas 
are passively received by the perceiving mind and only then associated 
into more complex ideas, such as the “mixed modes” that govern think-
ing and acting in social settings, those complex ideas are no more innate 
than is the idea of a unicorn. If moral ideas are not innate, then they must 
be learned, that is, each perceiving mind must passively encounter and 
acquire the constituent simple ideas and then associate them together 
in the specific ways that support sociality and morality. The question is, 
what guides this cognitive assembly process and guarantees its outcome in 
morally responsible individuals, especially if, besides sense receptors and 
reflective dispositions such as a propensity to compare ideas, we have noth-
ing else by way of innate endowment but a fundamental selfishness driven 
by passions of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance?
4. Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 294) makes the distinction at the outset of the third book of 
A Treatise of Human Nature, “Of Morals” (which lays the philosophical groundwork for his 
subsequent Essays, Moral and Political ): moral philosophy is practical insofar as it deals with 
“human passions and actions,” metaphysical philosophy is speculative insofar as it deals 
with the contents of mind, that is, impressions, ideas, and “the calm and indolent judgments 
of the understanding.” Meaning to deny a categorical difference between these two branches 
of philosophical “science,” Shelley (1965, 7:62–63) subsumes both under the name “meta-
physics”: “Metaphysics is a word which has been so long applied to denote an inquiry into 
the phenomena of the mind, that it would justly be considered presumptuous to employ 
another. But etymologically considered it is very ill adapted to express the science of the 
mind. It asserts a distinction between the moral and the material universe which it is pre-
sumptuous to assume. Metaphysics may be defined as the science of all that we know, feel, 
remember and believe: inasmuch as our knowledge, sensations, memory and faith constitute 
the universe considered relatively to human identity” (“Speculations on Metaphysics”).
5. Thus Locke (1961 [1690], 1:243): “These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and 
power have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modifications have 
been made most complex modes with names to them. For action being the great business of 
mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the 
several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed 
and laid up in memory and have names assigned to them, without which laws could be but 
ill-made, or vice and disorder repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst 
men without such complex ideas with names to them. . . . To conclude, let us examine any 
modes of action, v.g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, 
which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together; and we 
shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which together make up the complex 
ones signified by those names.”
6. Compare Sutton (1998: 231), summarizing the arguments of the cognitive scientists Jerry 
Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn: “Because associationist organisms are slaves of context or crea-
tures of the environment in this way, there is no guarantee that what is in their minds will 
develop the kind of constituent structure which, according to Fodor, is required to support 
the cognitive capacities of inference, reason, and judgment. Learning, for an associationist, 
is statistical modeling sensitive to the frequency of, for example, co-occurring items pre-
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 Accepting the premises, the answer can only be environmental con-
straints in the form of social induction—an argument that would explain 
the evident variability of cultures and the presence of social institutions 
of law and order, but that would seem to concede to moral relativism and 
political coercion. The sociocultural variability of moral standards pro-
vides key evidence for Locke’s (1961 [1690], 1:31) foundational argument 
against “innate ideas”: “there is scarce that principle of morality to be 
named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those only excepted, that are 
absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are 
neglected betwixt distinct societies) which is not, somewhere or other, 
slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, gov-
erned by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others.” 
Moral principles and “rules of living” are therefore largely if not wholly 
learned, by a creature whose natural disposition is appetitive, hence self-
ish, even outrageously so: “Principles of actions indeed there are lodged 
in men’s appetites, but these are so far from being innate moral principles 
that if they were left to their full swing, would carry men to the over-
turning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these 
exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments 
that will overbalance the satisfaction anyone shall propose to himself in the 
breach of the law” (ibid.: 34).
 Despite his more sanguine view of the “confin’d generosity” that sup-
ports kinship relations and other local attachments and provides a natu-
ral counterbalance to innate selfishness, Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 318, 
343) nevertheless concurs in viewing morality as artificial and therefore 
acquired, and he spells out more clearly than Locke the political impli-
cations of such a psychosocial theory. Institutions of government are nec-
essary to render “the observance of the laws of justice our nearest inter-
est, and their violation our most remote,” for “men are not radically able 
to cure, either in themselves or in others, that narrowness of soul, which 
makes them prefer the present [their own good and ease, including that of 
their loved ones] to the remote [the good and ease of perfect strangers]. 
They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their situa-
tion, and render the observance of justice the immediate interests of some 
particular persons [i.e., kings, magistrates, officers, armies, etc.], and its 
violation their more remote. These persons, then, are not only induc’d to 
observe those rules in their own conduct, but also to constrain others to a like 
sented in experience. . . . This leaves open the possibility that in a hostile environment, or 
in an unfavourable context of meagre stimuli, such minds would be unable to generate new 
combinations of existing items.”
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regularity, and enforce the dictates of equity thro’ the whole society” (emphasis 
added). If the moral principle of equity must be enforced upon the whole 
society, in what sense, and by what, is it “dictated”?
 It is precisely the issue of equity that provokes Shelley’s radical critique 
of empirical and associationist psychology. In his view, far from needing 
to be enforced, equity is our nature and therefore our destiny. In corre-
spondence with Elizabeth Hitchner in the months following his expulsion 
from Oxford, the topics of political morality and Lockean psychology con-
verge (in part because Shelley [1965, 8:101] had sent Hitchner the Essay 
concerning Human Understanding in hopes of winning an “ally in Locke”), 
and their conjunction leads Shelley to the moral rub of what he considers 
to be Locke’s otherwise unassailable position. Acknowledging that, in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, “equality in politics like perfection in 
morality appears now so far removed from even . . . visionary anticipa-
tions,” Shelley (ibid.: 131, 132) nevertheless asserts: “Were I a moral legisla-
tor I would propose to my followers that they should arrive at the perfec-
tion of morality.—Equality is natural.” To Hitchner’s demur that “nature 
has decidedly distinguished degrees among a degenerate race,” Shelley 
(ibid.: 143–44) responds with an appeal to Locke but in so doing winds 
up contradicting his own position that political morality, which is to say 
“equality,” is somehow a “natural” phenomenon or principle:
Admit for a moment that the composition of soul varies in every recipient, 
still Nature must have been blind to give a kingdom to a fool, a dukedom to a 
sensualist, an empire to a tyrant. If she thus distinguishes degrees, how does 
the wildest anarchy differ from Nature’s law . . . or rather how are they not by 
this account synonymous?—Again: Soul may be proved to be, not that which 
changes its first principles in every new recipient, but an elementary essence, 
an essence of first principles which bears the marks of casual [or] of intended 
impressions. For instance . . . the non-existence of innate ideas is proved by 
Locke; he challenges any one to find an idea which is innate. This is conclusive. 
If no ideas are innate, then all ideas must take their origin subsequent to the 
transfusion of the soul . . . in consequence of this indisputable truth, intellect 
varies but in the impressions with which casualty or intention has marked it. 
Where is now Nature, distinguishing degrees . . . or rather do you not see that 
Art has assumed that office even in the gifts of the mind.
But if intellect indisputably “varies” according to how “casualty” (i.e., 
chance or accident) and “intention” (i.e., education) dictate, then in what 
sense is equality a natural condition? Or more exactly, in what sense is 
the political theory of equality derivable from cognitive “first principles” 
or “an essence of first principles” if that principle or those principles are 
inevitably inflected and delimited by existential accident and sociocultural 
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exposure? The argument does not bode well for a distinction he had only a 
month and half earlier copied from Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron d’Holbach’s 
Système de la Nature (1770): “‘Modes of Worship differ, they are therefore 
the work of man—Morality is . . . universal and uniform, therefore it is the 
work of God’—or as I should say,” Shelley (ibid.: 124) added, “it is Morality 
which I cannot but consider as synonymous with the Deist’s God.” Again, 
if minds are in their rudiments constructed from unpredictable accident 
and variable instruction, in what meaningful sense could morality and its 
“perfection,” equality, be considered either universal or uniform?
 Arrived at this impasse, Shelley turns about and begins to question his 
Lockean premises. “This creation of the soul at birth is a thing I do not 
like,” he declares flatly at the end of 1811, and by the middle of 1812, still 
before his twentieth birthday, he has explicitly theorized the possibility 
of “Innate Passions,” “co-existent with our organization” (ibid.: 205, 328). 
Innate passions would provide what an earlier letter termed “instinc-
tive . . . motives of action” for those social dispositions—for example, “con-
geniality, sympathy, unaccountable attractions of intellect”—that “arise 
independent frequently of any considerations of your own interest” and 
therefore cannot be explained in “purely selfish” terms (ibid.: 48). Shelley’s 
unfinished essay “Speculations on Morals” was to develop this hypothesis 
of innate passions that provide instinctive motives for social actions, and it 
would thereby have shown, in Mary Shelley’s words, “how virtue resulted 
from the nature of man,” not despite it (ibid., 5:xi; emphasis added). Percy 
Shelley’s (ibid., 7:71) “Plan” for the essay spells out this literally radical 
proposal with respect to the two chief divisions of empirical philosophy:
That great science which regards the nature and the operations of the human 
mind, is popularly divided into Morals and Metaphysics. The latter relates to a 
just classification, and the assignment of distinct names to its ideas; the former 
regards simply the determination of that arrangement of them which produces 
the greatest and most solid happiness. . . . Moral science itself is the doctrine 
of the voluntary actions of man, as a sentient and a social being. These actions 
depend on the thoughts in his mind. But there is a mass of popular opinion, 
from which the most enlightened persons are seldom wholly free, into the truth 
or falsehood of which it is incumbent on us to enquire . . . before we can ascer-
tain the elementary laws, according to which these thoughts, from which these 
actions flow, are originally combined.
Morality “is the doctrine of the voluntary actions of man,” and “these 
actions” admittedly “depend on the thoughts in his mind,” that is, the con-
ceptual classification and linguistic symbolization of ideas (as described, 
e.g., by metaphysicians such as Locke and Hume). These thoughts or 
ideas are “originally combined” according to “elementary laws” and sub-
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sequently yield those particular “arrangements” that conduce toward “the 
greatest and most solid good.” Ascertaining the elementary laws of com-
bination and arrangement would thus effectively heal the popular division 
of what is after all a unified science by deriving morality from fundamental 
operations of the human mind.
 Moreover, to the extent that these operations were “lawful” in a regu-
latory as well as a combinatorial sense, they would provide a cognitive 
foundation for and guarantee of a “universal and uniform” moral endow-
ment in the species, however directed or misdirected by subsequent edu-
cation. Their demonstration would provide a nontranscendental solution 
to the philosophical problem that was exercising the best minds of the 
age. Shelley’s contemporary and fellow philosopher-poet, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, for example, advanced a parallel critique of the moral con-
sequences of associationism, but with almost exactly the opposite result. 
Coleridge’s concern, like Shelley’s, was that, insofar as it made the mind 
passively dependent upon variable environments, the mechanistic logic of 
association threatened to evacuate the constituent concepts and elements 
of moral thought and action. As John Sutton (1998: 233) has argued, Cole-
ridge believed that the
necessitarian laws of association would not only subordinate final to efficient 
causes in the human being, but would make the will and “all acts of thought and 
attention” into mere “parts and products of this blind mechanism” rather than 
what Coleridge claims they must be: “distinct powers, the function of which it is 
to control, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association” [citing 
Biographia Literaria]. . . . For Coleridge, the truth of associationism would . . . 
eliminate rationality, purpose, free will, the soul, consciousness, agency, choice 
and judgment, self, invention and creativity, art and beauty, prudence, ethics, 
and responsibility, as well as theology.
With so much at stake, Coleridge wants to insist on active and shaping men-
tal “powers” that oversee and regulate (“control, determine, and modify”) 
the otherwise “blind” and arbitrary processes of association, conducting 
them toward their proper ends or “final causes,” which would thus not be 
subordinated to their efficient causes. In his Treatise, Hume (2000 [1739–
7. Shelley (1965, 8:284) was fully aware of the baleful as well as the beneficial potential of 
education: “I know how much of good there is in human nature, spite of the overwhelming 
torrent of depravity which education unlooses. I see little instances of kindness and goodwill, 
almost everywhere, surely education, or impressions intentionally induced upon the mind, 
might foster and encourage the good, as it might eradicate the evil.” Shelley’s metaphor is 
accurate: the seeds of kindness and goodwill are not planted by education, only “fostered and 
encouraged” by it (or, conversely, drowned in torrents of moral depravity). The germ of this 
plant is sown by nature.
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40]: 115) had defined efficient causation as “the constant conjunction of two 
objects” and, as such, a necessary condition for all other kinds of causa-
tion (more accurately, judgments of causal relation): “All causes are of the 
same kind, and . . . in particular there is no foundation for that distinc-
tion, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine 
qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exem-
plary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv’d from the 
constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ’d, the cause is 
efficient; and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind.” Hart-
ley (1971 [1749], 1:114), confining himself more to observational description 
than to philosophical analysis, asserts simply the “Coincidence of efficient 
and final Causes.” But Coleridge seeks the directive preeminence of final 
causes over efficient, that is, an active, self-identical power that can inten-
tionally “control,” “determine,” and “modify” the processes and products 
of association as they unfold in the course of cognitive development and 
thus legitimately stand as surety for all those sociomoral first principles 
and operations that would otherwise be eliminated (“rationality, purpose, 
free will, the soul, consciousness, agency, choice and judgment, self,” etc). 
But this self-constituting power, as formal and final cause of association, 
cannot itself be caused by association—what then, and from whence, is 
it? Coleridge (1958 [1817], 1:202) decides the issue by fiat rather than argu-
ment, declaring that the requisite “living Power and prime Agent of all 
human Perception” is “as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite i am.”
 Whatever its rhetorical appeal, Coleridge’s transcendental argument 
would be philosophically dissatisfying to Shelley, who began his inquiry 
with a skeptical manifesto on The Necessity of Atheism and a methodological 
commitment to the strictest inductive rigor0 and who would see in any 
8. In Sutton’s (1998: 246) phrasing, borrowed from “connectivist” or “neo-associationist” 
cognitive theories, “Coleridge requires a central executive or cognitive central control sys-
tem to determine actively the ongoing processing of passive items of memory which are kept 
clearly independent of will, reason, and judgment.” These “independent” powers of will, 
reason, and judgment cannot be derived from association but must be grounded elsewhere.
9. For an excellent overview and critique of Coleridge’s transcendental “solution” to the 
philosophy of mind, see Bode 2009.
10. Shelley’s (1965, 7:63) inductive commitment is implicit in his critique of the modern phi-
losophers, from Locke forward, who have been insufficiently rigorous in their own applica-
tions of the method: “Nor have those who are accustomed to profess the greatest veneration 
for the inductive system of Lord Bacon adhered with sufficient scrupulousness to its regula-
tions. They have professed indeed (and who have not professed?) to deduce their conclusions 
from indisputable facts. How came many of those facts to be called indisputable? . . . Their 
promise of deducing all systems from facts has too often been performed by appealing in 
favour of these pretended realities to the obstinate preconceptions of the multitude, or by the 
most preposterous mistake of a name for a thing” (“Speculations on Metaphysics”).
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case that recourse to the transcendent only deflects and defers the ques-
tions it pretends to answer. Rather than leap outside the Lockean episte-
mological framework to ground agency and identity in something akin 
(“as a repetition”) to “the eternal act of creation,” Shelley intends to work 
through that framework, or at least in keeping with it, to a deeper under-
standing of those “necessitarian laws of association” that so worry Cole-
ridge. The “elementary” laws of association, as Shelley preferred to call 
them, govern the combinations of thought that, further combined, lead to 
moral judgments and voluntary actions. Therefore, as Shelley (1965, 7:111–
12) said in the Defence, morality (“the true and the beautiful, in a word, 
the good”) must inhere “in the relation, subsisting, first between existence 
and perception, and secondly, between perception and expression” (empha-
sis added). Crucially, as this final formulation makes clear, the explana-
tory logic is not only chronological (or developmental) but explicitly rela-
tional, which is to say analogical: existence is to perception as perception is 
to expression, or in other words, there is a “permanent analogy of things,” 
a set of essential “similitudes or relations” that constitute “all knowledge” 
(“perception”) and “human intercourse” (“expression”) (ibid.: 111, 115). An 
appeal to analogy can hardly be surprising in an era in which, as Earl R. 
Wasserman (1953: 67) long ago demonstrated, “most . . . philosophic roads 
led to the divine analogy.” But Shelley radicalizes the concept—literally 
installs it at the root of human epistemology and therefore of human soci-
ality and morality—and likewise motivates it developmentally. So much so 
that his “theory of mind,” as Mary Shelley (in Percy Shelley 1965, 5:xi) 
called it, challenges her description of it as “more simple, unimpugnable, 
and entire than the systems” of other writers, including “Berkeley, Cole-
ridge, and Kant.” Importantly, Shelley’s “system” would elegantly derive 
the moral principles of sympathy, disinterestedness, and equality, and with 
them that suite of conceptions and dispositions that is studied today under 
the rubric “theory of mind,” from the relational or proportional (ana)logic 
that, as its elementary law, drives the system of association.
11. Mary Shelley of course meant “theory of mind” in the broadest possible sense, but given 
that Percy Shelley’s theory culminated in and subsumed what is today meant more narrowly 
by “theory of mind,” the confusion is harmless.
12. Shelley’s conception of analogy thus marks a significant departure from most eighteenth-
century understandings and applications of analogy, not least because his version makes no 
appeal to the divine. According as it did with the materialist theory of simple percepts, 
which combine by laws of association into more and more complex ideas, it likewise skirted 
the philosophical worry about analogy that increasingly haunted the age. As Wasserman 
(1953) and others (e.g., most recently, and both on Erasmus Darwin’s complex and conflicted 
theory and use of analogy, Packham 2004 and Porter 2007) have argued, analogy was a com-
mon philosophical stopgap for the moral and theological unmooring that empirical meta-
physics, and especially the doctrine of associationism, threatened to occasion. Coleridge 
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 Coleridge (1958 [1817], 1:83) characterized associations as “blind” and 
“habitual,” but they are minimally constructive and purposive in that they 
seek similitude or, in Hartley’s (1971 [1749], 1:293) definition of analogy, 
the “Resemblance, and in some Cases Sameness, of the Parts, Properties, 
Functions, Uses, &c. any or all, of A to B.” Under this definition, funda-
(1958 [1817], 1:83), for example, citing the “process, by which Hume degraded the notion of 
cause and effect into a blind product of delusion and habit,” worried that “this same process” 
(i.e., skeptical and inductive argument) “must be repeated to the equal degradation of every 
fundamental idea in ethics and theology.” But these fundamental ideas have to be somehow 
grounded and propagated, and a common explanatory recourse, evident even in Coleridge’s 
transcendental formulation, was analogical argument from systematic correspondences in 
the physical and psychical worlds to a governing order, design, and purpose and thus (the 
idea of ) the regulatory influence of the divine. The analogical argument was essentially a 
new spin on a very old idea—the hierarchical chain of being, ascending from the grossest 
matter to the most refined spirit—and its aim was to “reconcile the new rhetoric, the new 
physics, the new psychology, and the old theology” (Wasserman 1953: 44). Even Shelley 
(1965, 8:227–28) could deploy it as such, for example, in theological discussions with Robert 
Southey in late 1811, recounted here in a letter to Hitchner:
I have lately had some conversation with Southey which has elicited my true opinions of God. 
He says I ought not to call myself an atheist, since in reality I believe that the universe is God. 
I tell him I believe that God is another signification for the Universe. I then explain:—I think 
reason and analogy seem to countenance the opinion that life is infinite; that, as the soul which 
now animates this frame was once the vivifying principle of the infinitely lowest link in the 
Chain of existence, so is it ultimately destined to attain the highest . . . that everything being 
infinite we can never arrive at its termination. How, on this hypothesis, are we to arrive at a 
first cause? . . . Southey agrees in my idea of Deity, the mass of infinite intelligence. . . . I, you, 
and he, are constituent parts of this immeasurable whole.
But this is analogy in the philosophical sense: as a mode of reasoning best used in cases 
where experiential evidence is lacking, for example, in Coleridge’s definition of the primary 
imagination as being “as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in 
the infinite i am.” The problem is, what assures that the correspondence picked out in any 
given analogy—Coleridge’s, for example, of the relation of resemblance between finite and 
infinite acts of consciousness or Shelley’s very similar but more mechanical one that relates 
individual minds to God as parts to a whole—has ontological and not just epistemological 
value (Wasserman 1953: 68)? What grounds an analogy and certifies its relational logic as 
“real” or existentially veridical? To ask that question is to return inquiry upon the process 
of association that achieves such analogies and to try to discriminate, as Hume did, quanti-
tative differences of frequency, intensity, and vividness among the countless analogies (and 
indeed levels of analogy) generated in conscious thought.
13. Hartley’s broad definition of analogy has a modern parallel in that of Gentner and 
Markham (1997: 48), who propose a cognitive “structure-mapping engine” at work in the 
perception of both similarity and analogy: “In a fundamental sense, similarity is like analogy, 
in that both involve an alignment of relational structure. . . . The difference between them is 
that in analogy, only relational predicates are shared, whereas in literal similarity, both rela-
tional predicates and object attributes are shared. . . . This contrast between analogy and 
literal similarity is in fact a continuum, not a dichotomy. Yet it is an important continuum 
psychologically, because overall similarity comparisons are far easier to notice and map than 
purely analogical comparisons, especially for novices [i.e., developing children].” Holyoak 
and Thagard (1995: 5) likewise relate similarity and analogy judgments, and like Shelley, 
they depict the drive to generate such judgments as foundational. In their view, analogical 
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mental structures of knowledge—from the percept (or pattern) recogni-
tion that constitutes simple ideas, to the relational insights that constitute 
complex ideas, to the relations of those complex ideas that constitute the 
mixed modes regulating our social action and communication—all such 
knowledge structures are created and hierarchically assembled by analogy. 
Locke (1961 [1690], 2:21) thus explains our categorization of natural objects 
and events as “the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it 
observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up 
in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms (for in that 
sense the word form has a very proper signification), to which, as particu-
lar things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, 
have that denomination, or are put into that classis.” In addition to object 
recognition and categorization judgments, Hume likewise derives the con-
cepts of object permanence, relations, and even objective existential status 
from the perception of resemblance:
When we have been accustom’d to observe a constancy in certain impressions, 
and have found, that the perception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns 
upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as 
at its first appearance, we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as 
different, (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individu-
ally the same, upon account of their resemblance.  (2000 [1739–40]: 132)
thinking is guided by three structural constraints: “First, analogy is guided to some extent 
by direct similarity of the elements involved. . . . Second, the analogy is guided by a pres-
sure to identify consistent structural parallels between the roles in the source and the target 
domains. . . . Third, the exploration is guided by the person’s goals in using it, which pro-
vides the purpose for considering it at all” (ibid.: 9). About the third constraint, they observe 
that the purpose of an analogy has both local semantic dimensions and more general affec-
tive ones: beyond its “compelling” local relation of two specific ideas and/or their inter-
nal relational structures, “something more fundamental also seems to be at work. There is 
something inherently pleasurable about finding a mesh between two superficially unrelated 
situations. Some basic human joy is triggered by the discovery of unexpected connections” 
(ibid.). Fodor likewise proposes a “passion for the analogical” as a fundamental feature of the 
“central processor” of human cognition; for discussion, see Sutton 1998: 237.
14. Gentner and Markham (1997: 53) note that “similarity is often given a central role in 
[perceptual] categorization,” and Holyoak and Thagard (1995: 12) define the “mental rep-
resentation of a category based largely on similar relations” as a “schema.” From a neuro-
physiological perspective, Edelman and Tononi’s (2000: 104) neural group selection theory 
predicts that basic “perceptual categorization” involves the detection, abstraction, and gen-
eralization of “common feature[s] across a variety of . . . percepts” or, more strictly, “com-
mon features of [neural] responses to different signals.” The cognitive linguist Givon (2005: 
40, 52) suggests that the “adaptive decision-making strategy associated with prototype-based 
categories may be called reasoning by feature association. It is the very essence of cognition and 
internal representation—mental or otherwise,” and “this is as true of the amoeba’s rudi-
mentary semantic representations of heat, light, touch, and salt concentration as it is of our 
seemingly open-ended Oxford English Dictionary.”
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The first [of the philosophical relations between ideas] is resemblance: And this is a 
relation, without which no philosophical relation can exist; since no objects will 
admit of comparison, but what have some degree of resemblance. (ibid.: 15)
If sometimes we ascribe a continu’d existence to objects, which are perfectly 
new to us, and of whose constancy and coherence we have no experience, ’tis 
because the manner, in which they present themselves to our senses, resembles 
that of constant and coherent objects; and this resemblance is a source of rea-
soning and analogy, and leads us to attribute the same qualities to the similar 
objects. (ibid.: 138–39)
Moreover, and much to Coleridge’s dissatisfaction, Hume (ibid.: 63) derives 
even causality from a “presumption” of resemblance in the conjunctions of 
entities across nonidentical instances:
The idea of cause and effect is deriv’d from experience, which informs us, that 
such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin’d 
with each other: And as an object similar to one of these is suppos’d to be 
immediately present in its impression, we then presume on the existence of one 
similar to its usual antecedent. According to this account of things, which is, I 
think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption 
of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and 
those, of which we have had none.
In sum, the resemblance-seeking operation of analogy is here argued to 
be the constructive first principle of all ideation, an elementary law under-
lying basic judgments of object identity and relation, of existence or non-
existence, and even of causality.
 Though Hume himself never quite drew this grand conclusion from 
his own analysis, Hartley did less than a decade later, positing analogy 
as the fundamental engine of associative thinking. As a result, “analo-
gies . . . some more exact and extensive, some less so, present themselves to 
us every-where in natural and artificial Things”—for example, in the pro-
portional relations of human, animal, vegetable, and mineral bodies; in 
“Numbers, geometrical Figures, and algebraic Quantities”; in the “several 
Words of each particular Language,” and its “Idioms, Figures . . . Similes, 
Fables, Parables, Allegories”; in judgments concerning “the Body Politic, 
the Body Natural, the World Natural, the Universe”; in judgments con-
cerning “the human Mind, the Minds of Brutes on the one hand, and of 
superior Beings on the other, and even the infinite Mind himself ”; and so 
forth (Hartley 1971 [1749], 1:293–97). Hartley’s (ibid.: 296) copious illustra-
tions (barely sampled here) seem to justify his general conclusion that “the 
Mind being once initiated into the Method of discovering Analogies, and 
expressing them, does by Association persevere in this Method, and even 
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force things into its System by concealing Disparities, magnifying Resem-
blances, and accommodating Language thereto.” However disordered and 
undertheorized, Hartley’s “method” or “system” of analogy suggests the 
scope of analogical thinking, its extension from perceived objects and rela-
tions (the kingdoms of nature) through symbolic systems for representing 
those objects and relations (language and mathematics) to sociomoral and 
intermental or “theory of mind” relations (“the Body Politic,” “the human 
Mind,” etc.).
 What Hartley’s analysis lacks, and what Shelley intended to provide, 
was a clearly theorized developmental chronology and motivational ratio-
nale for these several analogically driven operations of the mind. How, 
in what order, and for what end(s) does the analogical process of association 
assemble a fully functional and morally operational human mind? In a 
manuscript fragment associated with the Defence, Shelley exploits a physi-
cal analogy to query the nature and purpose of the “reciprocal tendency” 
that drives association. Imagination may be considered, he writes,
as mind combining the elements of thought itself. It has been termed the power 
of association; and on an accurate anatomy of the functions of the mind, it 
would be difficult to assign any other origin to the mass of what we perceive and 
know than this power. Association is, however, rather a law according to which 
this power is exerted than the power itself; in the same manner as gravitation is 
the passive expression of the reciprocal tendency of heavy bodies toward their 
respective centres. Were these bodies conscious of such a tendency, the name 
which they would assign to that consciousness would express the cause of gravi-
tation. . . . Association bears the same relation to imagination as a mode to a 
source of action. (Shelley 1965, 7:107)
Just as gravitation is the visible outcome of the “reciprocal” attractive 
forces of the relative masses of heavy bodies, so the association or combi-
nation of the elements of thought is but the visible outcome of the invisible 
operations of some more essential attractive force. Could physical bodies 
become conscious of the attractive forces they generate and are governed 
by, they would know the cause of that which we call gravitation; likewise 
if the elements of thought could become conscious of the force that draws 
them into relations, they would know the real cause of their association. 
Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 21) suggested that this first cause of association was 
possibly beyond analysis:
Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination 
suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become 
necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other 
collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject. One wou’d think the whole 
intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and that we did 
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nothing but pick out such as were the most proper for our purpose. There may 
not, however, be any present, beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by 
a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho’ it be always most perfect in the 
greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however inexplicable 
by the utmost efforts of human understanding.
But Shelley believed that any “accurate anatomy of the functions of the 
mind” would finally require an account of just this “magical faculty in 
the soul.” The details of the one he hypothesized can be best explained 
with reference to contemporary theory of mind; so with the empirical 
background established, I turn to the cognitive-theoretical implications of 
Shelley’s analogical theory of mind.
2. Cognitive Romanticism: The Analogical Theory of Mind
As currently hypothesized, theory of mind (ToM) is a cognitive capacity 
or set of cognitive capacities that allows human beings to conceive of 
other people’s mental states, including states of knowledge, belief, desire, 
and intention. Because another person’s knowledge, beliefs, desires, and 
intentions are not directly available to perception, such mental states must 
be inferred from the person’s behavior and from the social conventions 
that inform and contextualize such behavior. The question is, how do we 
achieve such inferences?
 As one would expect, there are competing hypotheses about the cogni-
tive function(s) involved, and some of the controversies are so long-standing 
as to be comprehended in a phrase (much as the overarching theory itself 
is comprehended in an acronym). Thus there is a central debate between 
theory theories of mind, which hypothesize a conceptual calculus sup-
porting inferential reasoning from external and conventional signals, and 
simulation theories of mind, which hypothesize instead a metaphorical or 
representational generalization from self to other. In a meta-analysis of 
false-belief experiments (perhaps the most venerable research paradigm 
for the study of theory of mind), Henry W. Wellman, David Cross, and 
Julanne Watson (2001: 678) explain the theoretical distinction between the 
two hypotheses as follows:
The relation between understanding one’s own mental states and understand-
ing others’ has been hotly debated by philosophers and psychologists at least 
15. For early articulations of theory-theory and simulation-theory approaches, see Gopnik 
and Wellman 1994 and Harris 1992, respectively. To get a sense of the diversity of related 
theories that shelter under these two umbrella terms, see the essays collected in Malle et al. 
2001.
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since Descartes. Within the areas of theory of mind, the debate is manifest in 
differences between simulation-theory accounts and theory-theory accounts. 
Simulation theorists argue that there is a special primacy to knowing one’s own 
mental contents. . . . First-person experience [i.e., direct experience of “one’s 
own mental contents”] not only has an immediacy and vividness that informs 
an understanding of mind, but understanding of other minds requires using 
one’s own experience to simulate that of others. In contrast, theory-theorists 
stress the development of an interrelated body of knowledge, based on core 
mental-state constructs such as “beliefs” and “desires,” that apply to all persons 
generically, that is, to both self and others.
The difference between simulation and theory theories is here captured 
in terms of the kinds of ideas related and the nature of their relation. In 
simulation or “like me” theories, mental states are equated through an 
analogical projection from source (typically, “first-person” experience) 
to target (typically, the “simulated” experience of the other person). In 
theory theories, by contrast, humans are hypothesized to be endowed with 
and/or to compile a semantic domain of generic “mental-state constructs” 
that are applied inferentially to specific behaviors of “both self and other.” 
One theory describes a relation of analogy between directly apprehended 
mental states (i.e., one’s own) and “simulated mental states” (i.e., those 
attributed to others), while the other theory describes a relation of infer-
ential super- and subordination involving semantic concepts (e.g., “belief,” 
“desire,” “intention”) as types and explicit behaviors (e.g., expressions, ges-
tures, and utterances) as tokens of those types.
 A related set of “hotly debated” issues concerns the order of acquisi-
tion and the scaffolding of cognitive functions that support theory of mind 
judgments, both in the evolving species and in the developing child (e.g., 
de Villiers 2007; Farrant et al. 2006; Nelson et al. 2003; Garfield et al. 2001; 
Dunbar 1998; Worden 1998). For example, does theory of mind depend on 
language acquisition, or does language acquisition depend on theory of 
mind? Since both are involved in sociality, is the social environment then 
a necessary, even sufficient, condition for theory of mind, or is it itself the 
product of a theory of mind, perhaps even of a theory of mind “module” 
hardwired in the brain?
 Though Shelley declares the topic “foreign to [the] purpose of this trea-
tise to anatomise” (it would have found its proper place in the “Specu-
lations on Morals,” if completed), he broaches the problem of theory of 
mind, and even gives an outline of his analogical solution, in the opening 
pages of his “Speculations on Metaphysics.” His reflections, fragmentary 
though they are, already implicate—in the etymological sense of “folding 
together”—both theory-theory and simulation-theory terminologies, insist-
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ing that the one (deductive inference) is a functional outcome of the other 
(analogical equation):
We are intuitively conscious of our own existence and of that connection in the 
train of our successive ideas, which we term our identity. We are conscious also 
of the existence of other minds; but not intuitively. Our evidence, with respect 
to the existence of other minds, is founded upon a very complicated relation of 
ideas, which it is foreign to [the] purpose of this treatise to anatomise. The basis 
of this relation is undoubtedly, a periodical recurrence of masses of ideas, which 
our own voluntary determinations have, in one peculiar direction, no power to 
circumscribe or to arrest, and against the recurrence of which they can only 
imperfectly provide. The irres[is]tible laws of thought constrain us to believe 
that the precise limits of our actual ideas are not the actual limits of possible 
ideas; the law according to which these deductions are drawn, is called analogy; 
and this is the foundation of all our inferences, from one idea to another, inas-
much as they resemble each other. (Shelley 1965, 7:61)
Shelley proposes that the relation “analogy” or “resemblance” “is the foun-
dation of all our inferences” and that it operates “irresistibly” in ways that 
conscious decision (“voluntary determination”) can neither “circumscribe,” 
“arrest,” nor prevent from recurring. It is the inexorable quality of this 
resemblance seeking and inference drawing that ultimately “constrain[s] 
us to believe that the precise limits of our actual ideas are not the actual 
limits of possible ideas.” How could they be, since one thought inevitably, 
by its irresistible analogical relation to some other thought, infers yet a 
third thought, whose “precise limit” will be surpassed by a subsequent 
inference, itself motivated by some inescapable analogy, and so forth? The 
mind thus generates “masses of ideas,” which themselves “periodically 
recur,” such that these too may be brought into a still higher, even more 
complicated relation, a relation of relations, by analogical perception of 
and inference from their commonalities or regularities.
 Shelley has two overarching points of cognitive interest here: first, that 
analogizing is a foundational and hierarchically scaffolded cognitive 
16. Hartley (1971 [1749], 1:77) explains the developmental logic in terms of “simple,” “com-
plex,” and “decomplex” ideas and in the bargain offers a suggestive hierarchical analogy 
from language: “As simple Ideas run into complex ones by Association, so complex Ideas run 
into decomplex ones by the same. But here the Varieties of the Association, which increase 
with the Complexity, hinder particular ones from being so close and permanent, between the 
complex Parts of decomplex Ideas, as between the simple Parts of complex ones: To which 
it is analogous, in Languages, that the Letters of the Words [today he would say ‘phonemes’] 
adhere closer together than the Words of Sentences, both in Writing and Speaking.”
17. Locke (1961 [1690], 1:89) proposes such an architectonic metaphor of the mind: “Thus 
the first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions 
made on it either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it 
reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything and 
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operation and, second, that scaffolded analogies, building from a foun-
dation of simple ideas to ideas of ever-increasing complexity and higher 
relations, ultimately produce our ideas about mind and mindedness, which 
is to say our “theory of mind.” As Shelley (ibid.: 60) puts it in the “Specula-
tions on Metaphysics,” “A scale might be formed . . . according to which all 
ideas might be measured, and an uninterrupted chain of nicely shadowed 
distinctions would be observed, from the faintest impression on the senses, 
to the most distinct combination of those impressions; from the simplest of 
those combinations, to the mass of knowledge which, including our own 
nature, constitutes what we call the universe.” At the combinatorial end of 
the series lies that most profound “knowledge . . . of our own nature” that 
is the proper object of an integrated metaphysical-moral philosophy, or 
what might today be called an adequately explanatory theory of mind.
 To be adequate, that theory must, for starters, be clear about what it is 
trying to explain. There are all sorts of phenomena that are social without 
involving a theory of mind: consider ant behavior, or the grooming and 
“fighting” behaviors of house cats, or the behavior of a dog playing fetch, 
who appears to know that his or her master intends to throw a ball (and can 
thus be tricked by the fake-the-throw-and-conceal-the-ball routine). But 
of course the dog only appears to “know”—in fact he or she has simply rec-
ognized a pattern (arm-throwing stimulus) and predicted an effect (ball to 
be fetched as a global response). Thus, though it can be explained in terms 
of resemblance relations, behavioral prediction on the basis of pattern 
the ground-work whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in 
this world. All those sublime thoughts, which tower above the clouds and reach as high as 
heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that great extent where the mind wan-
ders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond 
those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.”
18. Cf. Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 255–56): “’Tis evident, that sympathy, or the communication 
of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage and 
other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without their 
knowledge of that cause, which produc’d the original passion. Grief likewise is receiv’d by 
sympathy; and produces almost the same consequences, and excites the same emotions as 
in our species. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his 
fellows. And ’tis remarkable, that tho’ almost all animals use in play the same member, and 
nearly the same action as in fighting; a lion, a tiger, a cat their paws; an ox his horns; a dog 
his teeth; a horse his heels: Yet they most carefully avoid harming their companion, even 
tho’ they have nothing to fear from his resentment; which is an evident proof of the sense 
brutes have of each other’s pain and pleasure.”
19. As, for example, in Hume’s analysis of causality as a probability judgment based on the 
resemblance of different instances of co-occurring entities and events. In the terms of doggy 
logic: if in the past the overhead extension of an arm and hand holding a ball has frequently 
been correlated with the projection of the ball some distance and the joyful necessity of its 
immediate retrieval, then when the dog sees a similar extension of an arm, he or she will 
anticipate (again and again) a similar projectile effect.
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recognition is not (yet) a theory of mind. Theory of mind (additionally) 
involves a mental representation and attribution of “mindedness,” whether 
to self or other. Though you can think, “I think the dog thinks I’m going to 
throw the ball,” this is exactly what your dog isn’t doing and can’t do and 
what, by contrast, any normally developing five-year-old can do: attribute 
a false belief, that is, a counterfactual mental representation, either to the 
self (e.g., at an earlier or later point in time) or to another.0
 Herein lies the problem with both simulation and intersubjectivity 
theories of mind: the foundations they propose for sociomoral cognition 
may be developmentally necessary for, but are not sufficient in themselves 
to produce, a genuine theory of mind. For example, surely the cozened 
canine and its clever owner, or the two cats in an all-out housewide war, 
are “sharing . . . experience . . . not only, not even primarily, on a cogni-
tive level, but also (and more basically) on the level of affect, perceptual 
processes and conative (action-oriented) engagements” (Zlatev et al. 2008: 
144); mammals involved in these and similar sorts of engagements are evi-
dently “manifesting pleasure or interest in coordinated interactions” (Suss-
wein and Racine 2008: 144). But as John Barresi and Chris Moore (2008: 
40), writing in the same volume, insist,
The kinds of social sensitivity observed in infants as well as in many social ani-
mals should be seen as forms of non-reflective social understanding, dependent on 
an array of mechanisms that yield an ability to share mental states with others 
without necessarily recognizing that those shared mental states are in fact attrib-
20. Jackendoff (2007: 164–65) makes a similar point: “It is important to keep the notion of 
the social domain distinct from theory of mind, the ability of humans to attribute beliefs, 
desires, and intentions to others. In human social relations, we typically attribute a mental 
life to the persons with whom we interact. But theory of mind is broader: we don’t hesitate 
to attribute desires and intentions to a tiger that is stalking an antelope. It is beside the point 
whether the tiger really has desires: our folk theory of mind attributes them anyway. That is, 
theory of mind extends beyond persons to other animate beings.
 Conversely, not all aspects of social relations require a theory of mind: for a person to 
be a member of a certain clan and therefore to have certain obligations, it does not matter 
what we think that person believes or desires—it is just an objective social fact. Moreover, it 
makes sense to attribute some sort of social cognition to monkeys, who, according to much 
current thinking, lack theory of mind.”
 Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 148) made something of the same point but with a good deal 
more wit: “There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature, to bestow on external 
objects the same emotions, which it observes in itself; and to find every where those ideas, 
which are most present to it. This inclination, ’tis true, is suppress’d by a little reflection, and 
only takes place in children, poets, and the antient philosophers. It appears in children, by 
their desire of beating the stones, which hurt them: In poets, by their readiness to personify 
everything: And in the antient philosophers, by their fictions of sympathy and antipathy. We 
must pardon children, because of their age; poets, because they profess to follow implicitly 
the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so 
signal a weakness?”
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utable to individual agents. A satisfactory account of the development of social 
understanding will require an explanation of how these original mechanisms 
that enable early social responsiveness combine with later developing skills to 
yield more sophisticated forms of intersubjectivity. In parallel, such an account 
must specify how engaging in shared understanding or shared mental activities 
with others facilitates the later more individualistic understanding of mind.
Thus “sharing a psychological state,” a rubric which comprehends the 
“contagion of emotional states from one organism to another” (e.g., the 
spontaneous mutuality of laughter, fear, tears, etc., but also the cries of a 
vervet monkey, the groundhog alert, etc.), “is not the same thing as under-
standing that state” (ibid.: 56). Simulation theory, which typically proposes 
innate imitation routines as developmental precursors to theory of mind, 
runs into the same explanatory trouble: if our adaptive disposition to imi-
tate (e.g., facial expressions, goal-directed actions, etc.) is shared, perhaps 
right down to mirror-neuron architecture in the prefrontal cortex, with 
macaque monkeys, how do such innate imitation routines develop into 
an understanding of mind? At the foundation of many simulation theories 
is the notion that the social environment of the species provides neces-
sary information (i.e., perceptible spatiotemporal regularities) to an innate 
intermodal algorithm producing imitative behavior. “The central notion 
is,” according to two chief proponents of simulation theory, “that imitation, 
even early imitation, is a matching-to-target process,” whereby infants “can 
recognize cross-modal equivalences [e.g., the visual-motor coordination 
involved in grasping an object] between the acts they see others perform 
and their own tactile-kinesthetic sense of self. Moreover, the cross-modal 
comparisons run in both directions—infants can imitate (mapping from 
others to self ) and can recognize being imitated (mapping from self to 
other)” (Meltzoff and Brooks 2001: 177). Misleadingly, given this explana-
tion of bidirectional mapping between self and other, Andrew N. Meltzoff 
and Rachele Brooks (ibid.: 189) dub this “equivalence detection” function 
the “like me” analogy and explain that “the ‘like me’ analogy is a dis-
covery procedure that infants use to learn about people, but it is not itself 
a product of learning. Newborns bring it to their very first interactions 
with people, and it provides an interpretive framework for understanding 
the behavior they see.” Still, the question remains, how does this innate, 
21. See, e.g., Goldman 2001; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001; Moore 2006; Ratcliffe 2007: 130ff.
22. Hartley (1971 [1749], 1:107–8) is fascinating on the developmental role of imitation: 
“From the Account here given of the Actions of Handling and Speaking, we may understand 
in what manner the first Rudiments are laid of that Faculty of Imitation, which is so observ-
able in young Children. They see the Actions of their own Hands, and hear themselves 
pronounce. Hence the Impressions made by themselves on their own Eyes and Ears become 
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analogical “interpretive framework” develop from the understanding of 
behavior, a characteristic of most if not all social animals, to the under-
standing of mind and mindedness (knowledge, belief, desire, intention-
ality, etc.), an apparently unique characteristic of humans?
 Though Shelley’s “Speculations on Metaphysics” does not answer this 
question directly, the essay helpfully recasts it by clarifying what it must 
mean, minimally, to “understand mind.” Mind, Shelley (1965, 7:61) insists, 
can be understood only in terms of its contents, which is to say, in today’s 
parlance, only in terms of mental representation:
We see trees, houses, fields, living beings in our own shape, and in shapes more 
or less analogous to our own. These are perpetually changing the mode of their 
existence relatively to us. To express the varieties of these modes, we say, we 
move, they move; and as this motion is continual, though not uniform, we express 
our conception of the diversities of its course by—it has been, it is, it shall be. 
These diversities are events or objects, and are essential, considered relatively 
to human identity, for the existence of the human mind. For if the inequalities, 
produced by what has been termed the operations of the external universe were 
levelled by the perception of our being, uniting, and filling up the interstices, 
motion and mensuration, and time, and space; the elements of the human mind 
being thus abstracted, sensation and imagination cease. Mind cannot be con-
sidered pure.
The extract provides a concrete example of what Shelley (1965, 7:111–12) 
calls in A Defence of Poetry the relations “between existence and perception” 
and “perception and expression.” Existence (“the operations of the external 
universe”) stimulates the perception and (literal) re-cognition of shapes or 
patterns, “objects” and “events.” “To express” these perceptual “diversities” 
and “inequalities,” we have verbal inflections (e.g., “has been,” “is,” “shall 
be”). Shelley implies that, at least in this capacity, the linguistic system is 
analogous (relationally proportional) to the perceptual phenomena (in this 
case, temporality or “motion”) it would express. In other words, because 
perception or “mind” is characterized by the “diversities” or “inequalities” 
that we experience as an object-laden and eventful spatiotemporal world, 
to understand “mind,” to make “mind” an object of thought, is to re-present 
(whether for personal reflection or interpersonal communication) these 
essential elements of phenomenological experience (“express the varieties 
of [its] modes,” “express our conception of [its] diversities”).
associated Circumstances, and consequently must, in due time, excite to the Repetition of 
the Actions. Hence like Impressions made on their Eyes and Ears by others, will have the 
same Effect; or, in other Words, they will learn to imitate the Actions which they see, and 
the Sounds which they hear.”
23. Wasserman’s (1971: 146) analysis of this passage is fully relevant: “Since nothing is but as 
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 Ray Jackendoff has recently advanced a strikingly similar formulation 
in developing his own theory of social conception and representation. His 
analysis calls attention to an implication of Shelley’s discussion that might 
otherwise escape our notice: the phenomenological and (hence) representa-
tional roles of agency and intention. According to Jackendoff (2007: 161):
The cognition of space involves concepts of physical objects that are located in 
three-dimensional . . . space, that move in this space, and that exert forces on 
each other. Among the physical objects are natural objects like rocks and trees 
and rivers, artifacts with affordances for use like bicycles and tables, and ani-
mate objects like ants and worms and rats and tigers. The animates, unlike the 
rest, are conceptualized as capable of unpredictable self-initiated motion (i.e. 
volition)—and therefore, perhaps of desires, intentions, and even emotions as 
well. That is, animates are understood according to the intentional stance (in the 
sense of Dennett 1987).
To put the same point in Shelley’s terms, while both agents and objects 
“are perpetually changing the mode of their existence relatively to us,” they 
are predictably different in that, relative to one’s perceptual field, agents 
change aspect and position of their own volition, whereas objects change 
aspect and position as a result of our (or another’s) volition. Shelley’s obser-
vation that “we say, we move, they move” therefore illustrates not only the 
diversity of spatiotemporal relations but also the diversity of objective and 
intentional relations. Thus, in the case of objects, we say “we move (object, 
e.g., it/ourselves),” of agents, “they move (object, e.g., it/themselves).” 
Grammatical predication provides a proportional means of expressing 
the perceptual or phenomenological “diversity” or “inequality” of agent 
and object. Even prelinguistic infants and nonlinguistic infants of other 
species have been shown to be hardwired to detect these environmental 
(ir)regularities, but Shelley, interested as he is in human theory of mind, 
it is perceived and since we do not in fact perceive pure time or space, these supposed enti-
ties must be nothing more than the changing relations of our perceptions to each other and 
to our awareness of ourselves, schemata abstracted from the forms in which our disparate 
thoughts are arranged.”
24. See, e.g., Gallagher and Hutto 2008: 21: “In neonate imitation, which depends not only 
on a contrast, in some sense, between self and non-self, and a proprioceptive sense of one’s 
own body, but also a responsiveness to the fact that the other is of the same sort as oneself . . . 
infants are able to distinguish between inanimate objects and people. The fact that they imi-
tate only human faces . . . suggests that infants are able to parse the surrounding environment 
into those entities that perform human actions (people) and those that do not (things). . . . 
An intermodal tie between a proprioceptive sense of one’s body and the face that one sees 
is already functioning at birth. . . . The early capabilities that contribute to primary inter-
subjectivity constitute an immediate, non-mentalizing mode of interaction. Infants, notably 
without the intervention of theory or simulation, are able to see bodily movement as goal-
directed intentional movement, and to perceive other persons as agents.”
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emphasizes the manner in which we express or re-present such (ir)regularities 
in grammatical predication relations that have temporal and agentive and 
thus possibly intentional entailments (“has been, is, shall be,” “we move, 
they move”). Shelley implies that language itself involves systematic rep-
resentational analogues of mental experience that may contribute to, or in 
some sense even constitute, our theory of mind.
 To recapitulate: the “elements of the human mind” are, foundationally, 
those “objects” and “events” construed from the perceptual “inequalities” 
detected in “the external universe,” such as the phenomena of “trees,” 
“fields,” and “living beings in our own shape, and in shapes more or less 
analogous to our own.” These entities are presented in consciousness, 
thanks to innate analogy-seeking dispositions like pattern recognition and 
imitation. To corepresent or share such mental phenomena is to conven-
tionalize them in terms of certain irreducible and indispensable (phenome-
nological) coordinates; these include, to take Shelley’s list in reverse order, 
“space, time, mensuration, and motion” (with the last decomposing into 
agent and patient roles or values). As Shelley indicates, predication rela-
tions such as temporal inflections serve to “express” perceptually salient 
aspects of a given entity’s “mode of existence relative . . . to us”; language 
thus refers not to objects and events “out there” in the world but to objects 
and events as (re)presented “in here,” to mind. In other words, the linguis-
tic code is, at least at the level of its grammatical foundations, mentalistic 
to begin with. In this sense, language just is a theory of mind, because it 
always already encodes an environmentally constrained and socially con-
ventionalized view of mental experience.
 This theory would predict and readily account for the positive effect of 
temporal markers on young children’s success rates on false-belief tests, 
which have been a mainstay of theory of mind research. Considered in rep-
resentational terms, the fundamental task in a false-belief test is to main-
tain a prior counterfactual representation of a state of affairs in the face of 
a presently held factual representation of that state of affairs. For example, 
in one version of the “unexpected contents” experiment, the child is shown 
what is apparently, judging from the picture on the front, a closed box of 
raisins. When asked what is in the box, virtually all children say “raisins.” 
The box is then opened, revealing that it is filled with crayons rather than 
raisins. Thus a present, factual situation (true belief that the box contains 
crayons) has succeeded upon a past, counterfactual one (false belief that 
the box contains raisins). The ensuing false-belief question posed to the 
child is in effect a demand that the child mentally represent the counter-
factual past state of affairs, and the child is demonstrably assisted in this 
task by the explicitness and redundancy of temporal markers in the ques-
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tion—for example, “Remember, when you first saw the box, when it was 
closed, what did you think then was in the box?” (Nelson et al. 2003: 29). 
This sample prompt contains four mutually reinforcing temporal inflec-
tions and a temporal adverb, all of which structure a relation of temporal 
distance between the represented time (past) and the time of the shared 
discourse in which the question is being posed (present). Thus, especially 
through its deictic system, language appears to support just the kind of 
dual representation (“double-mindedness,” as it were) required by false-
belief tests.
 The Wellman et al. (2001) meta-analysis of false-belief research provides 
converging evidence for this hypothesis. The authors coded 178 studies 
of false belief in preschool children for thirteen kinds of experimental 
conditions, including such hypothetically salient ones as “the nature of 
the protagonist” in the experimental script (e.g., the child himself or her-
self, another person, a puppet, a picture or a videotape of a person, etc.), 
“motive for the transformation” of the nature or location of the object in 
question (ranging from no specific motive [the raisin box just happens to 
be filled with crayons] to explicit deception [“let’s hide these from Maxi 
while he’s out of the room”]), and “type of question” (whether about 
where the protagonist will or did look or what he or she would think, say, 
know, or believe in the particular circumstances). Their aim was to assess 
which conditions, if any, significantly interacted with the age of the sub-
jects involved to upset an otherwise robustly verified developmental pat-
tern, which predicts routine failure in false-belief tests for children at the 
age of three but routine success in such tests by the age of five. The dis-
covery that a particular condition significantly interacted with age would 
(potentially) reveal the extent to which cognitive abilities such as language 
underlie false-belief understanding, whereas the absence of any such cor-
relations would potentially support a competing view, in which theory of 
mind develops independently of other cognitive abilities as a more or less 
“encapsulated” conceptual module. Of all thirteen conditions, only one 
was found to interact significantly with age: “temporal marking,” that is, 
“whether [or not] the false-belief question explicitly mentioned the time 
frame involved” (ibid.: 661). When the question includes explicitly empha-
sized and often redundant temporal markers, even very young children 
may improve to above-chance success rates. This finding strongly sug-
25. Though Wellman et al. (2001: 674) found that “temporal marking fails to enhance very 
young children’s performance, enhancing judgments only for older children,” subsequent 
research “using temporal language that 3-year-olds would be able to follow” (Nelson et al. 
2003: 29) has yielded success rates suggesting that they too can profit from linguistic clari-
fication of the task.
Bruhn • Shelley’s Theory of Mind 397
gests that somehow the temporal coding of the language system assists 
young children in formulating a mental representation of a previously held 
mental representation or of another person’s mental representation (in 
either case, a counterfactual belief about a particular state of affairs). Why 
should this be so?
 To begin with, we must understand the counterfactual representation not 
as a preexisting “thing” but rather as a present cognitive process solicited 
by the false-belief question for the purposes of an ongoing social-dialogic 
interaction between the experimenter and the subject. The experimental 
task demand is located in a communicative situation unfolding between 
an “I” and a “You,” who together discuss possible mental representations 
of a particular state of affairs. This communicative context is neces-
sarily assumed and implicitly correlated in construing the proximal/dis-
tal relation (“now” vs. “then”) coded in the question’s temporal markers, 
or deixis. Such deixis indexes the present discourse situation and creates 
a bifurcated conceptual field in relation to it, in which the proximal or 
“present” can be distinguished from the distal or “past.” Most important, 
this systematic linguistic device that supports dual representation and thus 
improves children’s chances for success in false-belief tests is not a private 
but an intersubjective and communal property. In this view (discussed in 
Shelley’s terms below), mental representation—at least that higher-order 
kind that supports theory of mind—involves the corepresentation of what 
is experienced privately in each individual consciousness through pattern 
recognition, imitation, and other analogical processes, that is, objects and 
events (“entities”) in their actual and/or possible relations. Humans learn 
and engage in shared acts of representation not for the sake of the repre-
sentation but rather for the sake of social communion, of what has been 
called “mind sharing” in partial contradistinction to “mind reading” or 
“theory of mind.” Following Shelley, who insists that mind cannot be con-
26. Given this situation, Thompson (2001: 21) argues for the primacy of the “personalistic” 
over the “naturalistic” perspective: “By this I mean that our relating to the world, including 
when we do science, always takes place within a matrix whose fundamental structure is 
I-You-It (this is reflected in linguistic communication: I am speaking to You about It). . . . the 
mind as a scientific object has to be constituted as such from the personalistic perspective in 
the empathic co-determination of self and other.” Ratcliffe (2007) elaborates the phenome-
nological philosophical tradition supporting this view, and Sternberg (1983) describes its 
deictic foundations.
27. In their recent collection of essays The Shared Mind, Zlatev et al. (2008: 2–3) distinguish 
the “shared mind” theory from more traditional mind reading or theory of mind theories on 
four counts. In the more traditional theories: “[1] There is a primary separation between the 
self and (the minds of ) others. [2] The individual must bridge this separation either by some 
form of ‘theory’ or ‘simulation’ of the other’s mind, a process that is more or less fallible. 
[3] The main ‘bodily’ structures that are directly relevant for the process are those innate or 
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ceptualized apart from its ideational contents, I will prefer the somewhat 
less mystifying term “shared representation.” Language, in its origins, its 
acquisition, and its prototypical everyday use, may thus be conceived as a 
shared representation system designed to structure individuals’ cognitive 
activity for social-affective interactions and purposes.
 Shelley’s conception of linguistic deixis as an analogue coordinate sys-
tem supporting shared representation and thus mental state attribution 
surfaces again in his unfinished essay “On Life,” this time with respect 
to person deixis. Here again, Shelley (1965, 6:196) proceeds from Lock-
ean premises, declaring that perception and mental representation are the 
proper objects of “intellectual philosophy,” for “nothing exists but as it is 
perceived.” As such, existential “objects” only appear to be “external” but 
are in fact, like all other thoughts, “ideas” perceived in the mind:
The difference is merely nominal [i.e., linguistic] between those two classes of 
thought, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and of exter-
nal objects. Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of distinct 
individual minds, similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own 
nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The words I, you, they, are not signs 
of any actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of thoughts thus 
indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the different modifications 
of the one mind. (Ibid.)
Shelley (ibid.) immediately disavows any “idealism-as-radical-solipsism” 
construction of his meaning and underscores instead the much subtler lin-
guistic point: “Let it not be supposed that this doctrine conducts to the 
monstrous presumption that I, the person who now write and think, am 
that one mind. I am but a portion of it. The words I and you, and they are 
grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement, and totally devoid 
of the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them.” Shelley (ibid., 
acquired ‘modules’ engaged in inferential or simulation processes. [4] Cognition develops 
essentially ‘from the inside out’, with innate or acquired cognitive skills being eventually 
transferred or projected onto others for the purpose of explaining and predicting behavior.
 In contrast to the four claims listed above, the contributors to The Shared Mind broadly 
agree on the following propositions: [1] Human beings are primordially connected in their 
subjectivity, rather than functioning as monads who need to ‘infer’ that others are also 
endowed with experiences and mentalities that are similar to their own. [2] The sharing of 
experiences is not only, not even primarily, on a cognitive level, but also (and more basically) 
on the level of affect, perceptual processes and conative (action-oriented) engagements. [3] 
Such sharing and understanding is based on embodied interaction (e.g., empathic percep-
tion, imitation, gesture and practical collaboration). [4] Crucial cognitive capacities are ini-
tially social and interactional and are only later understand [sic] in private and representa-
tional terms.”
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8:227) had once stated this idea in the Coleridgean terms of the divine 
analogy—“Deity, the mass of infinite intelligence . . . I, you, and he, are con-
stituent parts of this immeasurable whole”—but here he’s abandoned the 
theological in favor of the grammatical analogy. Mind is not an “intense 
and exclusive” property of “distinct” or self-encapsulated individual 
brains, but rather an experience of phenomenological diversities such as 
space, time, and person (agent) that is conceptually apportioned to indi-
viduals in shared representations structured by language. Like the tempo-
ral markers in false-belief experiments, the deictic system of personal pro-
nouns carves up an otherwise unassigned phenomenological field, “mind,” 
so that representations of mental experience may be located at different 
addresses within representations. To generalize Shelley’s point: in what 
may be dubbed the representational level of analogy, the systematic and 
distributional relations that characterize the closed-class linguistic features 
(e.g., inflections, pronouns, determiners, etc.) are proportioned analo-
gously to the likewise systematic and distributed relations that constitute 
our phenomenological experience (the “diversities” that are experienced as 
objects, agents, and events).0
 Such a view invites us to reformulate a long-standing theory of mind 
conundrum concerning the “uniform coding” of dissimilar kinds of “infor-
mation” about “psychological activity.” The developmental psychologist 
Chris Moore (2006: 24) states the problem as follows:
Commonsense psychology [i.e., theory of mind] is built out of a common 
set of representations that uniformly code our own immediate psychological 
activity, the observable psychological activity of other people, and the noncur-
rent psychological activity of both self and others. We have seen that informa-
tion pertaining to our own current psychological activity has a different form 
(first-person information) from information pertaining to others’ psychologi-
cal activity (third-person information). Information pertaining to noncurrent 
28. Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 171) anticipated but never developed this point: “The whole of 
this [associationist] doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the 
present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can 
never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophi-
cal difficulties.”
29. Sutton (1998: 317) observes that connectivist models of consciousness are bedeviled by 
“the difficulty of extracting relatively ordered partitions in representational space from cer-
tain kinds of input patterns.”
30. In his analysis of this passage, Wasserman (1971: 147–48) appears to advance some-
thing of the same case: “The personal pronouns are relational, not substantive, terms. The 
universal Mind is the same as Existence . . . and all humans are factors of it. . . . Even the 
discreteness of all individual minds is an illusion resulting from a failure to understand the 
One Mind, of which they are parts.”
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psychological activity is different again because it has to be imagined rather 
than perceived. Nevertheless, commonsense psychology codes psychological 
activity of self and others, present and nonpresent in comparable terms.
For Shelley, the developmental problem is not how one comes to general-
ize across three such different sources of information in order to formulate 
a uniform or transpersonal coding for theory of mind, but rather how one 
learns to symbolically distribute an originally unassigned phenomenon 
(mental experience) for the purpose of shared representation and the kinds 
of social interaction, including moral thinking and behavior, it supports. 
31. Moore, writing with John Barresi, has revised his perspective and position such that they 
now more closely resemble Shelley’s in that the “uniform representational form” comes first 
in ontological development and individuation, both of self and other, only later: “So far we 
have advanced from a sub-personal understanding of the simple actions of self and other 
[i.e., dyadic interactions] that do not explicitly code for agent to the capacity for under-
standing shared IRs [intentional relations]. . . . This sharing entails the existence of repre-
sentations of IRs that are interpersonal, though probably not explicitly represented as inter-
personal. Rather the interrelated and similar IRs of self and other are understood using a 
uniform representational form that codes for concurrent identity between first-person infor-
mation of self and third-person information of other. But it is not yet the case that agents 
are recognized to be individual centres of intentional activity. The next level of understand-
ing . . . requires the ability to reflect on, or imagine IRs as properties of individual agents. 
According to IRT [intentional relations theory] this requires the use of imagination to fill in 
the third-person information for IRs of self and first-person information for IRs of others” 
(Barresi and Moore 2008: 48).
32. In his theory of the conceptual structure supporting “the social stance,” Jackendoff 
(2007: 214, 240) proposes an agentive role “YA” as a nonspecific, generic observer/expe-
riencer, the conceptual type of which the French on and German man are tokens. To this 
extent, his theory parallels Shelley’s. But he derives this role from the experience of the 
individual subject rather than, as Shelley does, the concept of individual subjectivity from a 
more generally conceptualized (unassigned) idea of agency. Jackendoff rather follows Hume 
(2000 [1739–40]: 371–72), who proposes that our individual points of view are “corrected” 
to more general, transpersonal ones: “We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, 
than with persons remote from us,” and this along any number of parameters (spatial, tem-
poral, cultural, class, etc.). If morals depend on sympathy, are our morals therefore likewise 
variable and more or less in force depending on distance? No, Hume answers, because, as 
in all things, we learn to generalize across individuals: “Our situation, with regard both to 
persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, 
may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a 
peculiar position with regard to others; and ’tis impossible we cou’d ever converse together 
on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they 
appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contra-
dictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general 
points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our 
present situation. In like manner, external beauty is determin’d merely by pleasure; and ’tis 
evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give us so much pleasure, when seen at the distance 
of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer to us. We say not, however, that it appears to 
us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that 
reflection we correct its momentary appearance. . . . Such corrections are common with 
regard to all the senses; and indeed ’twere impossible we cou’d ever make use of language, or 
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Jay L. Garfield, Candida C. Peterson, and Tricia Perry (2001: 534–35) 
advance a very similar hypothesis, emphasizing in the process (as Shelley 
ultimately would in the Defence) the crucial roles of social interaction and 
linguistic mediation for the development of mental representation and 
theory of mind:
Our self-knowledge and our knowledge of other minds . . . are of a piece, and 
are socially and linguistically mediated. Neither is possible without language, 
and each depends as well on non-linguistic social practices. . . . Neither our own 
minds, nor those of others are self-presenting phenomena. . . . The mind we 
perceive is a socially-determined mind, whose genesis is only partially driven by 
innate dynamics, and so whose ontology cannot be wholly individualistic.
Shelley, I would submit, gives us a more exact and elegant account of the 
“genesis” of this “socially-determined mind” in that he would derive both 
“language” and “non-linguistic social practices” from the same “innate 
dynamics” that produce the individual’s experience of mind. Note that I 
say “individual’s experience of mind”—that is, the phenomenal experience 
of mind, which is by definition “self-presenting.” But the experience of the 
individual mind, or more exactly, the mental representation of an individu-
communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances 
of things, and overlook our present situation.”
33. The hypothesis, it is worth noting, would predict exactly what the Wellman et al. (2001) 
meta-analysis revealed—the nonsignificance of certain experimental conditions, conditions 
that, from both theory-theory and simulation-theory perspectives, ought to make a difference 
to subjects’ success rates. Thus, for example, the conditions “nature of the protagonist” and 
“type of question” had no significant effect: the test can feature a doll, puppet, picture, real 
human (self or other), or videotaped human in the starring role and can ask where that 
protagonist would look, what she or he would say, or what she or he would think, believe, 
or know, and none of these variables appears to make any important difference. The fact 
that even inanimate objects like a doll or picture can be understood to have intentions (e.g., 
to look somewhere or to say something), desires (to find a chocolate, to eat raisins, or to 
draw with crayons), and beliefs (that an object is in a particular location or that a container 
contains a particular kind of object) shows that, given the right social-dialogic context, such 
as a false-belief experimental situation, mental states can be attributed to anything—a doll, 
a picture, a pet, a car, a god, a brick, etc.—provided that it occupies an agentive role in a 
socially mediated script.
34. This was a commonplace of empirical philosophy and its introspective method: an act 
of perception (e.g., of a simple idea or quality, such as color, sound, etc.) is its own indisput-
able evidence. Thus, e.g., Shelley (1965, 7:342), in a passage from “Speculations on Meta-
physics”: “Let us contemplate facts; let us . . . in the great study of ourselves, resolutely 
compel the mind to a rigid consideration of itself. We are not content with conjecture, and 
inductions, and syllogisms, in sciences regarding external objects. . . . As in these, let us 
also, in considering phenomena of the mind, severely collect those facts which cannot be 
disputed. Metaphysics will thus possess this conspicuous advantage over every other science, 
that each student, by attentively referring to his own mind, may ascertain the authorities 
upon which any assertions regarding it are supported. There can thus be no deception, we 
ourselves being the depositaries of the evidence of the subject which we consider.”
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ated mind, whether “our own” or “those of others,” is, Shelley suggests, 
quite another thing. Tapping the same analogical processes that develop 
ideas out of sensory impressions and that enable the imitation of social 
others, the social-linguistic shared representation system builds primitive 
regularities into ideas of increasing complexity and abstraction (“super-
ordination”). But in this case the primitive regularities and advanced ideas 
are social-symbolic conventions rather than “natural” categories. This is 
not to say that the shared representational system is unconstrained by the 
properties of the biophysical organism or environment; on the contrary, 
as Shelley argues in the Defence, both serve to establish species-specific 
parameters in which social systems naturally and necessarily develop, 
phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically. But that which develops within 
those parameters is neither innate nor modular nor, strictly speaking, 
genetic. Shelley (1965, 7:137) calls it a “being within our being”—that is, a 
social being within our natural being—and from this social being derive our 
ideas of both our own and other minds.
 The second paragraph of A Defence of Poetry discloses the full relational 
logic of Shelley’s (ibid.: 110) hypothesis. It stipulates the analogical adjust-
ment of cognitive architecture to natural and social environments and the 
scaffolded evolution from the latter of symbolic representation systems, 
including expression, gesture, and ultimately language:
A child at play by itself will express its delight by its voice and motions; and 
every inflexion of tone and every gesture will bear exact relation to a corre-
sponding antitype in the pleasurable impressions that awakened it; it will be the 
reflected image of that impression. . . . In relation to the objects which delight 
the child, these expressions are, what poetry is to higher objects. The savage (for 
the savage is to ages what the child is to years) expresses the emotions produced 
in him by surrounding objects in a similar manner; and language and gesture, 
together with plastic or pictorial imitation, become the image of the combined 
effect of those objects, and of his apprehension of them. Man in society, with 
all his passions and pleasures, next becomes the object of the passions and plea-
sures of man; an additional class of emotions produces an augmented treasure 
of expressions; and language, gesture, and the imitative arts, become at once the 
representation and the medium, the pencil and the picture, the chisel and the 
statue, the chord and the harmony. The social sympathies, or those laws from 
which, as from its elements, society results, begin to develop themselves from 
the moment that two human beings coexist. . . . Hence [humans], even in the 
infancy of society, observe a certain order in their words and actions, distinct 
from that of the objects and the impressions represented by them, all expression 
being subject to the laws of that from which it proceeds. (Ibid.)
35. See Donald 2001: 208 for a properly qualified version of this claim.
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To begin extracting the riches of this passage, consider the parity of terms 
in the first two sentences and in the last. Both the child at play and the 
human at the dawn of society are presented with “objects” and “impres-
sions”: the “objects” present themselves from without, that is, from what 
Shelley in the “Speculations on Metaphysics” called “the operations of 
the external universe,” the “impressions” from within, that is, from the 
associated affect of such objects with respect to “the passions and pleasures 
of man.” Shelley (ibid.: 111) will presently describe this external/internal 
relation quite concisely as that “subsisting . . . between existence and per-
ception.” The pleasurable experience of object and affect generates in turn 
a further and analogous relation “between perception and expression.” 
Though “expressions,” whether the “voice and motions” of the child or the 
“words and actions” of the social adult, are “distinct . . . from the objects 
and the impressions represented by them,” they are nevertheless analogous 
to them in that “every inflexion of tone and every gesture . . . bear[s] [an] 
exact relation to a corresponding antitype” in the represented impression 
or object. Still, any such expression, qua expression, will “observe a certain 
order” that derives neither from the psychological “order” of the affect nor 
from the physical “order” of the object, but instead from “the laws of that 
from which it proceeds.” So gestural, vocal, and verbal expressions, which 
Shelley here explicitly identifies as forms of “representation,” are analogi-
cally related to the cognitive operations that give us the mental presen-
tation of feelings and things but are not immediately structured by these 
operations. What, then, does immediately structure such expression?
 Shelley’s final circumlocution only begs the question, but there are, 
speaking generally but nontranscendentally, only two possible answers: 
“expression” must derive its fundamental structure from either a psycho-
physical or a social source, and the remainder of the quotation suggests 
that Shelley contracts simultaneously for both answers. “Society results” 
from the elementary laws of “the social sympathies,” yet these sympa-
thetic laws “begin to develop themselves” only “from the moment that 
two human beings coexist.” Analogy, the sympathetic law of attraction 
between discrete but resembling individuals (whether [ideas of ] objects, 
events, or agents), provides an innate algorithm, as it were, but requires 
the input of social interaction to generate that “additional class of emo-
tions” that will in turn “produce an augmented treasure of expressions.” 
Shelley specifies this “treasure” as “language, gesture, and the imitative 
arts,” now functioning in a dual capacity, as “at once the representation 
and the medium.” The child’s (or lonely savage’s) expressive “tone” and 
“gesture” were already representations, in the sense of analogically repro-
ducing his or her affect-laden (cf. “pleasurable,” “delight,” “passions and 
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pleasures”) perceptual experiences, but social interaction harnesses such 
expressions and transforms them into the media of a whole new class 
of representations. In ontogenetic time, as Romantic theorists explicitly 
argued, social interaction commences at birth in terms of the (m)other/
child relationship; this and subsequent social relationships instantiate and 
mediate those “laws” to which “all expression,” or representation, is fun-
damentally “subject.” This is not to say that the irreducible phenome-
nological categories of space, time, extent, and motion have no structural 
relation to the expressions that would convey them. They do, but these 
mental categories contribute not their actual but only an analogical structure 
to expressions, which are actually structured by physical constraints (e.g., 
the anatomy of the hand or vocal tract) and social conventions (e.g., more 
or less arbitrary signifier/signified relations). Expressions do not present 
mental experience but represent it; it follows that their code cannot be the 
36. Richardson (2001: 66) has demonstrated how pervasive this social-developmental 
hypothesis had become by Shelley’s day: “In 1799 one T. O. Churchill completed his trans-
lation of Herder’s Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, published in London the next 
year. Among many remarkable passages, it includes this one on the infant’s creation of an 
object world through passionate interaction with its mother: ‘The suckling at the mother’s 
breast reposes on her heart: the fruit of her womb is the pupil of her embrace. His finest 
senses, the eye and ear, first awake, and are led forward by sound and figure: happy for him, 
if they be fortunately led! His sense of seeing gradually unfolds itself, and attentively watches 
the eyes of those around, as his ear is attentive to their language, and by their help he learns 
to distinguish his first ideas.’” Richardson correlates this passage with Wordsworth’s “Blest 
the infant Babe!” effusion from The Prelude (1799 version) and wonders if in fact there is not 
some direct line of influence from Johann Gottfried von Herder to Wordsworth, perhaps 
via Coleridge, who is known to have requested this work of Herder’s in November 1799. 
But Richardson (ibid.: 67) rejects this hypothesis in favor of the more likely argument that 
Herder and Wordsworth arrived at the same developmental point by each reading widely 
in “Lockean sensational psychology, Enlightenment anthropology, the vein of French radi-
cal thought running back to Diderot, and the new naturalistic and biological approach to 
mind then prominent in scientific and radical circles. . . . Each [Wordsworth and Herder, 
and Shelley, I would add] depicts a process of cognitive unfolding that confounds distinc-
tions between reason and emotion and that places the infant in a world of passionate social 
interaction from the moment of birth.” See also ibid.: 75, where Richardson discusses and 
quotes Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man: “Reid . . . also feels impelled to 
reground the origin of language in human physiology: ‘Certain features of the countenance, 
sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body’ make up a language of ‘natural signs’ that we 
interpret automatically ‘by the constitution of our nature, by a kind of natural perception 
similar to the perceptions of sense.’”
37. Susswein and Racine (2008: 155) have recently advanced a very similar argument: 
“Although human reference requires particular mental and neurological capacities, refer-
ence is not a mental or neurological phenomenon, but a social one. . . . It is not a mental 
or neurological event which makes a first finger extended towards X a reference to X. It is 
the fact that this extended finger is a technique or practice of orienting others towards X in 
a particular context.”
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natural one underlying consciousness but must be an analogically related 
one founded in and mediated by the sociocultural environment.
 In Hartley, particularly, Shelley would have discovered the rudiments of 
this developmental account of language, including the idea that the same 
38. Shelley’s ideas here were echoed and elaborated in the mid-twentieth century by the 
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, whose theories are today enjoying something of a renais-
sance in theory of mind research. The editors of The Shared Mind, for example, cite Vygot-
sky (specifically his Mind in Society) as one of the great precursors for the theories of inter-
subjectivity developed by the volume’s contributors: “Every function in the child’s cultural 
development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level: first 
between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This 
applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. 
All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals” (Zlatev 
et al. 2008: 4).
 Garfield et al. (2001: 530–31) likewise acknowledge the influence of Vygotsky and in par-
ticular his theory of how the still “higher function” of language originates in “actual relations 
between human individuals”:
Vygotsky argues that language evolves initially out of the infant’s instinctive vocal noisemak-
ing (crying, digestive sounds, etc.) into a non-symbolic social coordination device when par-
ents come to treat these noises as a form of communication. . . . Vygotsky’s argument is both 
empirical and conceptual. He emphasises, as we do, that the process of learning to think is 
a process of skill acquisition, and that the social environment supplies both the initial reason 
to acquire this skill, and the necessary supports to enable its acquisition. Only later, with suf-
ficient linguistic mastery, is it possible to think autonomously and hence to think about [i.e., 
re-present] thought.
Moore (2006: 136–37) takes essentially the same tack, recognizing, like Shelley, “two funda-
mental aspects of language[,] that it represents and that it is a form of social interaction,” 
and, like Vygotsky and Garfield et al. (2001), construing symbolic representation as a lever-
aged development from “non-symbolic social coordination”:
Just as the triadic interactions [i.e., self/other/object] evident from about 9 months of age 
involve the coordination of social intentions around objects, so language use involves the 
coordination of social intentions involving words and their referents. Spoken words are initially 
the actions that are used to coordinate joint attention to objects. . . . Words serve to regulate 
interactions in much the same way as gestures and facial expressions do. They are acquired 
as infants mold their vocalizations through imitation to the sounds they hear others making 
toward them. In this way, imitation leads infants to adopt the same vocal means as others to 
regulate their triadic interactions.
Donald (2001: 283–84) similarly concludes that social imitation, or mimesis, is both nec-
essary and sufficient for the development of language, even at the level of the universal 
grammar: “Linguistic universals spring from the context in which real-world languages are 
learned and, more important, in which they evolved. . . . Thus . . . the features of Universal 
Grammar emerge smoothly from an analysis of gesture, mime, and imitative behavior. The 
‘language instinct’ exists, but it is a domain-general instinct for mimesis and collectivity, 
impelled by a deep drive for conceptual clarification.” “Emerge smoothly” is doubtless an 
overstatement.
39. He would have also found it, in more compressed form, in Erasmus Darwin’s Temple of 
Nature, which likewise suggests (but does not explain) fundamental links between imitation, 
theory of mind, and language: “ever-active Imitation finds / The ideal trains, that pass in 
406 Poetics Today 30:3
associative mechanism that accounts for ideation in general will likewise 
account for the acquisition of a symbolic system to represent such ideation. 
Hartley (1971 [1749], 1:105ff., 271) thus explains phoneme and word acqui-
sition in terms of the associations generated and reinforced by processes 
of perceptual pattern recognition. But in Hartley (ibid.: 106) analogical 
perception is still derived from “the Recurrence of the same [or as Hume 
would insist, only similar] accidental Causes,” whereas Shelley wants to 
derive even the perception of recurrence from some “elementary law” “co-
extensive with our organization,” a gravitation-like force of attraction that 
seeks and discerns resemblances between ideas and individuals. The per-
ception of recurrence would thus depend not (or not merely) on “acciden-
tal” efficient “Causes” but rather (or also) on the formal and final causes 
of analogy. In Shelley’s view, the ontology and teleology of analogy cause 
those effects of pattern recognition and social imitation that are instinc-
tively deployed by the developing child. First, the child masters thereby 
a repertoire of as-yet noncommunicative gestures, facial expressions, and 
vocalizations. Once mastered, these in turn are generalized, using the same 
analogical matching and inference operations, though now on a different 
order of inputs (that is, gestures, facial expressions, and vocalizations), to 
master a repertoire of routines that coordinate shared attention and enact 
social intentions (e.g., pointing and vocalizing a sequence such as /ðæt/). 
These routines are in turn generalized to form an increasingly complex and 
abstracted system of shared representations and so on, through progres-
sive iterations, until the full-blown linguistic system is acquired. The social 
environment plays a crucial role throughout the process, for it models and 
constrains the nature of the gesture, expression, or vocalization at each 
level. Driving the whole process are innate “social sympathies,” the “laws 
from which, as from its elements, society results”—first in terms of non-
symbolic social coordination but ultimately and quintessentially in terms 
of the language system that structures shared mental representations, 
which are the sine qua non of theory of mind.
 This hypothesis may help answer the explanatory demand posed but not 
quite met by Garfield et al. (2001: 525): “What we need . . . is an account 
of how we can bootstrap from innately determined capacities, together 
with skills acquired through development and learning[,] into the ability 
to represent mental states and to mind-read.” In the terms of Shelley’s 
hierarchical and language-first account of theory of mind, the problem 
at the intermediate stage, between “innately determined capacities” and 
kindred minds; / Her mimic arts associate thoughts excite / And the first language enters 
at the sight” (quoted in Richardson 2001: 77).
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“the ability to represent mental states,” might be stated as follows. Even 
given the bootstrapping of pattern detection and imitation devices, how 
does the developing child (or hominid society) learn to reinterpret context-
dependent expressions like vocalizations and gestures as symbolic expres-
sions whose values are independent of the spatiotemporal context of utter-
ance or use?0 For example, how does /ðæt/ uttered as a shared-attentional 
and -intentional gesture, say, with reference to an out-of-reach object or 
food item, come to be reanalyzed to support, without additional gestural or 
visual cuing, the distal distinction in “do you want this one or that one?”
 Shelley’s intuitive emphasis on the role of deixis in mental representa-
tion, coupled with his understanding of hierarchical generalization (scaf-
folding) in cognitive development, outlines a fairly specific answer to this 
fundamental question about how the mind attains linguistic symboliza-
tion. In its prototypical form—that enjoyed by (m)others and newborn 
infants throughout the world—deixis indexes a shared situation of utter-
ance: the speaker (“I”), the auditor (“you”), the space (“here”), and the 
time (“now”). Over and over in the course of development, and exactly for 
the purposes of social-affective interaction, the infant will hear utterances 
such as “look at this,” “see this,” “what’s this?” and the like to help focus 
shared attention on a proximal object and “look at that,” “see that,” “what’s 
that?” and the like to share attention to a distal object. Just as a developing 
infant can zero in on the phonemic frequencies in the linguistic environ-
ment, so can that infant detect usage frequencies for longer sequences.
40. Locke (1961 [1690], 1:126) explained categorical generalization as follows: “The mind 
makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done 
by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other exis-
tences and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. 
This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general 
representatives all of the same kind, and their names, general names, applicable to whatever 
exists conformable to such abstract ideas.” Dedre Gentner and Robert M. French, speaking 
of verbs but in a way that can be readily extended to the other parts of speech, capture the 
analogical nature of such generalization: “In a sense, verbs are institutionalized analogies. 
They are devices for conveying relational structures independently of the concrete objects to 
which the structures are applied” (quoted in Holyoak and Thagard 1995: 223).
41. See Moore 2006: 61–62: “Using sequences of nonsense syllables, researchers have shown 
that infants are able to learn sequences that tend to occur together on a reliable basis. This 
ability, called statistical learning, may well be related to the perception of temporally pat-
terned features [of the environment and especially conspecifics], and is probably of rather 
general significance in infant development.” Hartley (1971 [1749], 1:106–7) already had the 
basic idea:
It is evident, that an articulate Sound, or one approaching thereto, will sometimes be produced 
by this conjoint Action of the Muscles of the Trunk, Larynx, Tongue, and Lips [of the develop-
ing infant]; and that both these articulate Sounds, and inarticulate ones, will often recur, from 
the Recurrence of the same accidental Causes. After they have recurred a sufficient number 
of times, the Impression which these Sounds, articulate and inarticulate, make upon the Ear, 
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 Once infants can reproduce the phonemic patterns themselves, they use 
such patterns to share attention among objects present in the discourse 
situation. They normally do so with a high initial error rate for correct usage 
between systematic alternatives (e.g., producing “that” indiscriminately for 
proximal and distal pointing, referring to self as “you,” etc.) but otherwise 
with a very high success rate in terms of competence and performance 
(i.e., using “that” appropriately as a demonstrative gesture, appropriately 
grounding “you” in one of the two persons in an ongoing dialogue). At this 
primitive stage, utterances (not only of deictics but of an ever-expanding 
lexicon of proper names, generic nouns, action verbs, adjectives for qualia 
and affect, etc.) are not verbal symbols but, as Moore (2006) suggests, 
vocal actions, akin to brachia-manual gestures like pointing and showing, 
and thus absolutely context dependent in terms of production and refer-
ence. Yet even as this vocal-action system is being practiced and mastered, 
the very same cognitive operations that enabled phoneme recognition 
and imitation, then the recognition and imitation of sequential phonemic 
patterns, are now in the process of detecting regularities among various 
vocal actions, learning to discriminate types and discovering higher-order 
relations among those types (for example, the systematic relation of “this/
that,” “I/you,” and “now/then”). To appreciate such higher-order cate-
gorical relations among signs or signals is, as Terrence Deacon (1997: 79–
92) has suggested, a cognitive first step toward symbolic understanding 
and communication.
 Deacon (ibid.: 451) argues, moreover, that this “common symbolic 
will become an associated Circumstance (for the Child always hears himself speak, at the same 
time that he exerts the Action) sufficient to produce a Repetition of them. And thus it is, that 
Children repeat the same Sounds over and over again, from many Successions, the Impression 
of the last Sound upon the ear exciting a fresh one, and so on, till the Organs be tired. It follows 
therefore, that if any of the Attendants make any of the Sounds familiar to the Child, he will be 
excited from this Impression, considered as an associated Circumstance, to return to it. But the 
Attendants make articulate Sounds chiefly; there will therefore be a considerable Balance in 
favour of such, and that of a growing Nature: So that the Child’s articulate Sounds will be more 
and more frequent every Day—his inarticulate ones grow into Disuse. Suppose now, that he 
compounds these simple articulate Sounds, making complex ones, which approach to familiar 
Words at some times, at others such as are quite foreign to the Words of his native Language, 
and the first get an ever-growing Balance in their Favour, from the Cause just now taken notice 
of; also, that they are associated with visible Objects, Actions, &c. and it will be easily seen, 
that the young Child ought, from the Nature of Association, to learn to speak much in the same 
Manner as he is found in Fact to do.
 
42. Ozçalişkan and Goldin-Meadow (2006) and Sinha and Rodriguez (2008) have recently 
presented further evidence and theory that converge with this account, the former in terms 
of the prominent role played by demonstrative pronouns in children’s early acquisition 
and expression of similarity and analogy relations and the latter in terms of the conceptual 
development of deictic perspective shifting from early dyadic and triadic interactions, such 
as “peekaboo” and “give-and-take.”
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understanding” or “shared code for translating certain essential attributes 
of memories and images between individuals” is developmentally prior to 
and essential for theory of mind. Even self-representation must be seen as 
a functional output of—rather than, as simulation or “like me” theorists 
would have it, input to—the social-symbolic system:
Self-representation, in the context of representations of alternative pasts and 
futures [as in false-belief tests], could not be attained without a means for sym-
bolic representation. . . . this sense of self emerges slowly as children mature. It 
becomes progressively more facile in perspective shifting. . . . And, as studies 
of this process in various mentally and socially handicapped children suggest, 
the extent to which it is developed depends both on the extent of exposure to 
relevant social-symbolic experiences and on the symbol-processing capacity of 
the individual.
“Perspective shifting” is, we should recall, a functional property of deixis—
prototypically, it grounds discourse referents in a proximal-distal schema 
that systematically shifts with changes of speaker and/or the spatiotempo-
ral context of utterance. This is a technically precise way of stating 
Shelley’s point that the deictic system is structurally designed to assign 
(acts of ) mental representation to individuals for the social purposes of 
communication and interaction. As Deacon suggests here and Shelley 
explicitly argues in the “one mind” passage from “On Life,” what is appor-
tioned or “shared out” is a conventionalized conceptualization of the phe-
nomenological field (or “feel,” in the sense of Damasio 1999) of mind. One 
or another dimension of this field (e.g., “motion and mensuration, and 
time, and space”) is the primitive value underlying the given deictic con-
vention and conception. But because each deictic term participates in a 
differential system of schematized proximal/distal relations, its primitive 
and unified value can be carved up into alternate representations that, for 
43. For discussion, see Bruhn 2005: 387–97 and references. Levinson (2003: 51, 333) reminds 
us of Karl Buhler’s “concept of the transposed deictic center” and Charles Hockett’s “design 
feature of displacement,” linking them via a note to theory of mind: “The ‘theory of mind’ 
literature suggests that an essential element of human cognition involves the ability to take 
the perspective of the other—this is what makes teaching, communication, and strategic 
competition possible.” Farrant et al. (2006) have recently presented experimental results 
showing a correlation of theory of mind and visual-perspective-taking (VPT) abilities and 
a developmental role for language in the acquisition of such abilities. Their article con-
cludes with a call for future research investigating “which aspect(s) of language is/are most 
important for ToM and VPT development. Such research could investigate whether syntax, 
and in particular, mastery of sentential complements . . . or the more pragmatic aspects 
of language . . . is more important” (ibid.: 1850). Shelley’s theorizing would predict some 
fairly specific correlations between mastery of the language’s deictic system and ability to 
pass various kinds of theory of mind tests (see de Villiers 2007 for a discussion of some of the 
principal theory of mind experimental approaches employed to date).
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purposes of social (and later self-) communication are conceptually allo-
cated to speaker, auditor, or other; here or there; now or then. Thus what is 
originally an unassigned, but nevertheless socially embedded, mental pre-
sentation becomes a differentiated, socially shared representation. Shelley 
(1965, 6:196) puts the point exactly with reference to the deictic pronouns: 
“The words I, you, they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting 
between the assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks 
employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind.”
 The theory that self and other are originally identified or, more exactly, 
undifferentiated is bolstered by an impressive range of developmental data 
illustrating the essential selflessness of infant experience, including a fas-
cinating preferential attention experiment that discloses the social bias of 
innate imitation programs. Such a bias suggests that experience of self lit-
erally depends upon and conforms to experience of others:
Philippe Rochat and Rachel Morgan presented their 3- to 5-month-old infant 
participants with a TV with a split screen showing two live videos, both of their 
own legs and feet. One of the displays was derived from a video camera opposite 
the children, the other from a video camera looking down at the children’s legs 
from above. In this way the two displays showed live videos of the babies’ legs, 
but one looked as it would from the babies’ perspective and the other looked as 
it would from someone else’s perspective. The infants preferred to look at the 
video that showed their legs as they would appear from someone else’s perspec-
tive. Not only did the infants look longer but when they looked at the observer’s 
view, they also tended to move their legs more. (Moore 2006: 66)
The infants’ bias toward information presented from the other’s point of 
view reveals not just a preference for novelty but an attentional orientation 
toward what Moore calls “third-person” information, that is, the objec-
44. Especially interesting in this context is the recurrent finding that “children’s correct 
responses to false-belief questions for self versus other [either] did not differ” (Wellman et al. 
2001: 665) or were consistently higher for other across preschool ages (Nelson et al. 2003: 
30), which likewise suggests that self-representation emerges from a generalized, undifferen-
tiated theory of mind and not vice versa. Hume (2000 [1739–40]: 228) also remarked on the 
developing child’s preferential orientation toward the (human) other:
I own the mind to be insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks 
after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the 
appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new 
tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command 
in his solitary and calm moments. Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the 
liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who communicates all 
the actions of his mind; and makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us 
see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus’d by any object. 
Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of passion, because such an idea becomes 
a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or 
conception.
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tively perceived actions and behaviors of others. Though both videos in 
fact present unprecedented information (that is, none of the infants had 
probably ever watched a video of his or her own legs kicking, never mind 
from which perspective), the one depicting the kicking legs from “some-
one else’s perspective” would appear to depict someone else’s legs, situated across 
from the infant rather than below her or him. The infants’ evident pleasure 
in what appears to them to be an imitative social interaction lends some 
support to the “matching to target” hypothesis of the simulation theo-
rists but not to the implicit differentiation and directionality of the “like 
me” analogy (e.g., Meltzoff and Brooks 2001: 174, 177), which apparently 
asserts that some sort of original self-awareness antedates and underlies 
the concept of the other. Instead, the developing infant innately and ana-
logically conforms to others, preferentially attuning himself or herself to 
their action and (elsewhere) vocalization patterns. The conventional forms 
of these actions and vocalizations are environmentally mediated and fun-
damentally shared, “so [their] ontology cannot be wholly individualistic” 
(Garfield et al. 2001: 535). Indeed their ontology is not only social but also, 
in its earliest developmental forms, self/other identical. In this view, soci-
ality involves the sharing of one form across multiple individuals rather 
than the averaging of multiple forms into a transpersonal theory of mind. 
In Shelley’s terms, social interaction installs “a being within our being,” 
and it is this “one mind” that underlies both self- and other representation 
and thus “mind reading” and sociomoral reflection.
 This radical analogical identification with the other, with all its atten-
dant “passions and pleasures,” from kicking legs to coordinating attention 
to sharing mental representations, is thus an innate, then a social, then a 
symbolically distributed function, but what drives the process, and what is 
the goal (or functional limit) of its operation? Donald (2001: 214ff.), one of 
the few contemporary theorists to address this neglected question of the 
teleology of human cognitive development, does so in terms of Locke’s 
45. Given the triumph of the evolutionary model in biology, teleology has become something 
of a bad word in scientific circles, but it should not be ruled out just yet (or perhaps needs to 
be ruled back in), as argued, e.g., by Terrence Deacon and Jeremy Sherman (2007). Their 
theory is, as they put it, “forward engineered” from thermodynamics to “morphodynamics” 
(that is, relations, attractions, and effects based upon shape, for example, in molecular bond-
ing and catalysis) to “teleodynamics” (that is, emergent purposiveness in biological systems). 
Though admittedly “highly idealised and speculative,” their discussion is nevertheless
sufficiently plausible to illuminate the link between mere chemistry and chemistry with a 
function. To the extent that living, evolving organisms exhibit functions, not merely chemical 
reactions, we see glimmerings of end-directedness in what they do. We describe even simple 
organisms as exhibiting adaptations or functions with respect to something like their own 
good. They encounter favourable or unfavourable environments and have needs or appetites 
for some of what they find there, and they compete to maintain themselves and their lineage. 
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eighteenth-century French interpreter, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac. In 
his Treatise on the Sensations (1754), Condillac developed the thought experi-
ment of the Statue, a “virtual mind,” as Donald (2001: 216) characterizes 
it, with only “two built-in components: sensory pathways, which provided 
its sole source of experience, and innate capacity, which endowed it with 
the ability to carry out certain operations on its sensations.” Something 
akin to Shelley’s “innate passion” of analogy, Condillac’s “innate capacity” 
describes a developmental “drive system” that seeks certain pleasurable 
ends in its associative operations (ibid.: 218). Donald (ibid.: 217) explains 
this cognitive engine in terms of “curiosity”:
Condillac was subtle enough to realize that his Statue could not start its life 
cycle in a state of complete neutrality or indifference toward sensation. He gave 
it an innate bias to notice things and to care about what it noticed. Curiosity 
must be a basic property of any cognizing system, and this presents us with a 
strong scientific challenge. It is not obvious how a mere brain could have such 
a property, but clearly many brains have it. There seems to be a self-reinforcing 
joy in discovery, and curiosity has a subjective, sensual aspect. Its pleasures can 
be as intense as any others. Without this self-reinforcing feature and the intoler-
able pain of boredom, there would presumably be no motive force for a mind to 
exert any effort to understand the world.
In his subsequent elaboration of Condillac’s point, Donald (ibid.: 284, 289) 
speculates that even higher-order cognitive operations, like the “instinct 
We recognize in organisms, then, the most basic analogues of what in our mental experience 
we describe as intention, significance, desire, and purpose. For this reason, we should dis-
tinguish the special causal features of such systems with yet a further category of dynamics: 
teleodynamics, or tendencies to change with respect to target states, potentialities, represented 
possibilities, and so on. (Ibid.: 20)
In an early letter, Shelley (1965, 8:201–2) proposed a rather similar “hypothesis” about the 
teleology of all “organized beings”:
What is the Soul? Look at yonder flower. The blast of the North sweeps it from the earth; it 
withers beneath the breath of the destroyer. Yet that flower hath a soul: for what is soul but that 
which makes an organized being to be what it is,—without which it would not be so? On this 
hypothesis, must not that (the soul) without which a flower cannot be a flower exist, when the 
earthly flower hath perished? Yet where does it exist, in what state of being? have not flowers 
also some end which Nat[ure] destines their being to answer? Doubtless, i[t] ill becomes us to 
deny this because we cannot certainly discover it; since so many analogies seem to favor the 
probability of this hypothesis. I will say, then, that all Nature is animated, that microscopic 
vision, as it hath discovered to us millions of animated beings whose pursuits and passions are 
as eagerly followed as our own; so might it, if extended, find that Nature itself was but a mass 
of organized animation.
 
46. Sternberg’s (1978, 2003a, 2003b) discourse narratology would immediately enrich and 
deepen Donald’s theory of “curiosity” by aligning it with two other universal cognitive 
forces, “suspense” and “surprise,” and illustrating their diverse dynamics in a wide range of 
discourse-driven situations.
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for mimesis [i.e., social imitation] and collectivity” and in turn the “lan-
guage instinct,” may be “impelled” by this “basic” curiosity, this “deep 
desire for conceptual clarification” that yields the “raw feel of intellectual 
satisfaction.” But the structure and dynamics of this innate “desire” and 
“satisfaction” remain, Donald admits, “major puzzle[s] for cognitive sci-
ence to resolve” (ibid.: 289).
 With less puzzlement, perhaps because he follows greater authorities, 
notably Plato and Dante, Shelley adopts the traditional term “love” to 
47. Writing with Macgillivray, Moore states the problem in different terms but specifically 
with reference to theory of mind, which can be decomposed into distinct representational 
and motivational components:
Given that in any social situation, both cooperation and competition are potential tactics, 
it must be the case that accompanying the representation of non-current interests, there is a 
desire to act in their favor. If not, then the actor would automatically implement the action that 
was in the best immediate interests of himself or herself. In short, the individual must be able 
not only to represent the mental states of others and the future self but also to care about them. 
There must be a way in which the imagined state of affairs can achieve sufficient motivational 
power for it to override the motives provided by the current state of affairs. We suggest that the 
natural tendency to empathize or “feel into” imagined states of affairs provides the necessary 
motivational power. . . . [However,] This simple distinction between the representational and 
the motivational components of action organized toward noncurrent interests masks consider-
able complexity, and we do not pretend to have identified all the psychological processes that 
are involved. (Moore and Macgillivray 2004: 54–55)
The view that some “natural” empathic tendency motivates theory of mind operations and 
representations is echoed and enlarged by Evan Thompson, whose hypotheses regarding the 
relation of “Empathy and Consciousness” accord perfectly with Shelley’s. For Thompson 
(2001: 1) as for Shelley, “individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrela-
tion of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective”; moreover, “the concrete 
encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, understood as a unique and 
irreducible kind of intentionality.” This is an intriguing if riddling suggestion: if empathy is 
irreducibly a “kind of intentionality,” who or what intends, and what exactly is the “unique 
and irreducible” structure of that special “kind” of intention?
 As Malle et al. (2001: 7) observe, there is also an important “where” question to be con-
sidered: “Psychologists have examined the emergence of shared meaning out of individual 
intentions, a necessary process for successful conversation and social coordination. . . . Inter-
esting questions about the ‘location’ of joint intentions and the ‘location’ of shared meaning 
arise. One wonders, for example, whether there actually exist group minds that ‘have’ men-
tal states or whether social perceivers merely metaphorically extend their folk ascriptions of 
mental states to group agents. These puzzles notwithstanding, the ascension from individual 
to shared mental phenomena is essential to human relations.”
48. Cf., for example, Plato’s Symposium, quoted here from Shelley’s (1965, 7:186, 194, 197) 
1818 translation: “The desire and the pursuit of integrity and union is that which we call 
love”; “Love, therefore, and every thing else that desires anything, desires that which is 
absent and beyond his reach, that which it has not, that which is not itself, that which it 
wants”; Love “fills up that intermediate space between . . . two classes of beings, so as to bind 
together, by his own power, the whole universe of things.” Shelley (ibid., 9:279), we know, 
owned Cary’s (1901 [1814]: Purgatorio 18.19–27) translation of the Divine Comedy (completed in 
1814), which renders Dante’s essentially scholastic (or neo-Aristotelian) conception of love 
in the correlative terms of what was, by Shelley’s day, canonical empiricism, e.g.: “The 
soul, created apt / To love, moves versatile which way soe’er / Aught pleasing prompts her, 
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designate the motive force driving all the scaffolded forms of analogy, 
from innate pattern recognition to the self/other identification that under-
lies theory of mind and morality. His several descriptions of love, from his 
early essay “On Love” through the likewise fragmentary “A Discourse on 
the Manners of the Ancients, relative to the Subject of Love” to his fully 
articulated theory in A Defence of Poetry, add up to a cognitively compelling 
account of this many splendored thing. “Love,” Shelley (1965, 6:201–2) 
claims in the first of these essays,
is the bond and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with 
everything that exists. We are born into the world, and there is something within 
us which, from the instant that we live, more and more thirsts after its likeness. 
It is probably in correspondence with this law that the infant drains milk from 
the bosom of its mother; this propensity develops itself with the development of 
our nature. We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were of 
our entire self, yet deprived of all that we condemn or despise, the ideal proto-
type of every thing excellent or lovely we are capable of conceiving as belonging 
to the nature of man. Not only a portrait of our external being, but an assem-
blage of the minutest particles of which our nature is composed; a mirror whose 
surface reflects only the forms of purity and brightness; a soul within our soul 
that describes a circle around its proper paradise, which pain, and sorrow, and 
evil dare not overleap. To this we eagerly refer all sensations, thirsting that they 
should resemble or correspond with it.
In a note to this passage, Shelley writes, “These words are ineffectual and 
metaphorical. Most words are so—No help!” (ibid.: 6:202). The essence 
of the idea, however, is that the “thirst” that drives everything from the 
newborn latching instinct to cognitive-scientific reflection is for a condi-
tion of relation—“resemblance” or “correspondence”—so complete as to 
constitute identification, the attainment of “entire self.” In “A Discourse 
soon as she is waked / By pleasure into act. Of substance true / Your apprehension forms 
its counterfeit; / And, in you the ideal shape presenting, / Attracts the soul’s regard. If she, 
thus drawn, / Incline toward it; love is that inclining, / And a new nature knit by pleasure 
in ye.”
49. Shelley’s notion of the cognitive “miniature” thus differs from Hartley’s in being driven 
not by chance recurrence of similar objects and entities but by an innate passion for analogi-
cal identification. Shelley hoped by this move to obviate the moral problem of individual 
variability (spelled out by Hartley himself ), which seemed an inescapable consequence of 
associationist philosophy. For example, in Hartley’s theory (1971 [1749], 1:64, 81, 370), which 
proposes that “sensory Vibrations, by being sufficiently repeated, will beget a Disposition 
to miniature Vibrations [in the ‘medullary substance’ of the brain] corresponding to them 
respectively,” “it follows . . . that the intellectual Pleasures and Pains may be greater, equal, 
or less, than the sensible ones, according as each Person unites more or fewer, more vivid or 
more languid miniature Vibrations, in the Formation of his intellectual Pleasures and Pains,” 
and from this it follows that our moral dispositions and inclinations cannot but vary:
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on the Manners of the Ancients, relative to the Subject of Love,” written 
after he had completed his exceptionally fine translation of Plato’s Sympo-
sium, Shelley (ibid., 7:228) clarifies the nature of this “universal thirst” or 
irreducible intentionality: it is “for a communion not merely of the senses, 
but of our whole nature, intellectual, imaginative, and sensitive.” However, 
though love seeks as a type for its “mirror”-like “antitype” (ibid., 6:202), no 
existing object or social other can perfectly answer the functional demand, 
and so the “communion” is always incomplete, partial, and still to seek: 
“This object, or its archetype, forever exists in the mind, which selects 
among those who resemble it, that which most resembles it; and instinc-
tively fills up the interstices of the imperfect image” (ibid., 7:228).
 For Shelley, this resemblance-seeking and difference-abridging operation 
is the engine that drives all analogies, which for their part inevitably fail to 
realize the operational goal of identity or perfect indifferentiation and so 
are continuously surpassed0—and hierarchically transcended—by further 
analogies. “Love” motivates the perceptual and developmental analogies 
By degrees he learns, partly from the Recurrency of these mechanical Tendencies, inspired 
by God, as one may say, by means of the Nature which he has given us; and partly from the 
Instruction and Imitation of others; to pursue every thing which he loves and desires; fly from 
every thing which he hates; and to reason about the Method of doing this, just as he does upon 
other Matters. And, because Mankind are for the most part pursuing or avoiding something 
or other, the Desire of Happiness, and the Aversion to Misery, are supposed to be inseparable 
from, and essential to, all intelligent Natures. But this does not seem to be an exact or correct 
Way of Speaking. The most general of our Desires and Aversions are factitious; i.e. generated 
by Association; and therefore admit of Intervals, Augmentations, and Diminutions. And, who-
ever will be sufficiently attentive to the Workings of his own Mind, and the Actions resulting 
therefrom, or to the Actions of others, and the Affections which may be supposed to occasion 
them, will find such Differences and Singularities in different Persons, and in the same Per-
son at different Times, as no-way agree to the Notion of an essential, original, and perpetual 
Desire of Happiness, and Endeavour to attain it; but much rather to the factitious associated 
Desires and Endeavours here asserted.
 
50. Cf. Holyoak and Thagard 1995: 131: “The essence of analogies is that if the target 
domain is sufficiently isomorphic to the source domain, then the mapping can be used to 
fill in gaps in knowledge of the target. The catch is that for complex realistic situations, the 
isomorphism between the source and target domains will be approximate at best. . . . the 
inferences generated by analogy must be evaluated, adapted to the unique requirements of 
the target, and possibly abandoned.”
51. Locke (1961 [1690], 1:100) had given a theological spin to this psychological fact: “Beyond 
all this, we find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure 
and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that 
our thoughts and senses have to do with, that we, finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and 
want of complete happiness in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might 
be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him, with whom there is fullness of joy and at whose right hand 
are pleasures forevermore.” Today’s developmental psychologists, for example, Moore (2006: 45, 
59), prefer to describe young children as “motivated pattern detectors” with a strong tendency 
to “novelty preference” or “habituation recovery” (emphasis added). Shelley, alas, seems 
to have shown such novelty preference in his personal relationships, but of course Locke’s 
theory, as Dante’s and Plato’s, would predict such dishabituation. An early instance is his 
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underlying pattern recognition and social imitation and in turn the repre-
sentational analogies underlying language use and theory of mind. How-
ever quaint his terminology, Shelley’s theory seems—anachronistically 
enough—to specify and thereby clarify Donald’s (2001: 277–78) similar but 
comparatively mystifying comments about the cognitive origins and tele-
ology of our “symbolic-cultural” systems:
The quality of thoughts can be improved with language. But thoughts do not 
start there or end there, nor are they judged there. Words and sentences define 
and clarify knowledge that resides elsewhere, in foundational semantic pro-
cesses that we share with other primates and where the motive force for the 
evolution of language must have originated. It is easy to swim in our symbolic-
cultural sea without noticing this, but our ability to perceive the inadequacies 
of spoken and written language reveals its deep cognitive roots. Our conscious 
mind strives after clarity to placate its own inner semantic processes. . . . Con-
sensual symbol systems exist for the purpose of satisfying our deep semantic 
(metaphoric?) intuitions.
Donald asserts but does explain an essential “motive force,” which appar-
ently equates to “inner semantic processes” and “intuitions” that may be, 
at base, “metaphoric.” After all the foregoing, it should be clear that this is 
putting rather woolly new clothes upon a cognitive theory that emerged, 
embodied in the naked word analogy, roughly two centuries ago. Shelley 
would agree that the “symbolic universe” of human culture, includ-
ing especially its sociomoral theory of mind, derives from a mind that 
seeks an ever-clearer image of itself, of its “deeper,” as yet unexpressed or 
imprecisely expressed and therefore still unsatisfied “semantic intuitions.” 
disaffection from Hogg, here explained in a letter to Hitchner, who would meet the same 
fate, and permanently, in less than a year: “How I have loved him you can feel, but he is no 
longer the being whom perhaps ’twas the warmth of my imagination that pictured. . . . I love 
no longer what is not that which I loved” (Shelley 1965, 8:225).
52. Thus buried in Hartley’s (1971 [1749], 1:296) exhaustive list of analogies (but, as it were, 
extracted and radically rationalized in Shelley’s analysis) is that crucial series that links all 
attributions of mindedness, from “the human Mind, [to] the Minds of Brutes on the one 
hand, and of superior Beings on the other, and even the infinite Mind himself.” This tanta-
lizing suggestion of the analogical relation of theory of mind to (the concept of ) omniscience 
will certainly repay careful study, especially with respect to narrative and narration. Early 
exposure to and practice in storytelling, as Gallagher and Hutto (2008: 28) have recently 
(and rather fuzzily) hypothesized, “will normally involve jointly attending to the mentalistc 
terms such as ‘wish,’ ‘believe’ and ‘know’ and discussing what the story characters know, feel, 
and want. During this process, children learn how states of mind behave in relation to each 
other and other terms in the psychological family.” But the questions remain: what does it 
mean to represent a state of mind, and how do specific acts of narration encode and therefore 
prime such representations? A supremely relevant essay, both for its historical-theoretical 
purview and its subtle analysis of the constituent dimensions of “omnimentality,” is Meir 
Sternberg’s “Omniscience in Narrative Construction: Old Challenges and New” (2007).
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Shelley (1965, 6:202) has something very much to this effect in mind when 
he discerns “dimly . . . within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were 
of our entire self,” “the ideal prototype of every thing . . . we are capable 
of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man.”
 But Shelley (ibid., 8:328) is clearer not only about the cognitive foun-
dations and developmental hierarchies of the force that he calls analogy in 
its operational dimension and love in its teleological dimension, but also 
about the social-moral and historical consequence of this “innate passion” 
that is “co-extensive with our organization.” In the “A Discourse on the 
Manners of the Ancients, relative to the Subject of Love,” Shelley (ibid., 
7:228) states categorically that “Man is in his wildest state a social being: 
a certain degree of civilization and refinement ever produces the want of 
sympathies still more intimate and complete. . . . This want grows more 
powerful in proportion to the development which our nature receives from 
civilization.” Donald (2001: 324) appears to concur, stating that “human 
purpose always has a cultural dimension and is inherently distributed in its 
origins. Ours is a collective teleology, and its creative engine is a conscious 
mind that has assimilated the algorithms of culture and is thus a vehicle 
through which the collective cognitive-cultural hierarchy can act.” But for 
Shelley (1965, 7:110), the “algorithms of culture”—for example, the laws 
governing expression and shared representation—themselves derive from 
still more foundational “social sympathies, or those laws from which, as 
from its elements, society results.” These laws of social sympathy, Shelley 
continues,
begin to develop themselves from the moment that two human beings coexist; 
the future is contained within the present, as the plant within the seed; and 
equality, diversity, unity, contrast, mutual dependence, become the principles 
alone capable of affording the motives according to which the will of a social 
being is determined to action, inasmuch as he is social; and constitute pleasure 
in sensation, virtue in sentiment, beauty in art, truth in reasoning, and love in 
the intercourse of kind.
How much is claimed here in how little space and how cogently, elegantly, 
parsimoniously. Here Shelley specifies the “elemental” aims of human 
53. Shelley appears to have answered Hume’s (2000 [1739–40]: 304) demand for a fully sat-
isfying moral philosophy: “It may now be ask’d in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, 
that distinguishes moral good and evil, From what principles is it deriv’d, and whence does it arise 
in the human mind? To this I reply, first, that ’tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular 
instance, these sentiments are produc’d by an original quality and primary constitution. For as 
the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite, ’tis impossible that our original instincts 
shou’d extend to each of them, and from our very first infancy impress on the human mind 
all that multitude of precepts, which are contain’d in the compleatest system of ethics. Such 
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cognition, sociality, and history: “equality,” “diversity,” “unity,” “contrast,” 
“mutual dependence.” These “principles” are themselves derivable, as 
Shelley (ibid.: 61) hypothesized in the “Speculations on Metaphysics,” 
from analogy, an identity-seeking function that is hierarchically elaborated 
into clearer and clearer conceptions of the deep structure of the (socio-
analogical) mind, that is, its elemental principles and goals of “equality in 
diversity,” “unity in contrast,” or “mutual dependence.” Such phrases cap-
ture the telos of everything from innate pattern recognition and imitation 
routines (those “pleasures of sensation”) to complex social relations such as 
morality (“virtue”), creativity (“art”), science (“reasoning”), and first and 
last, relationship (“love in the intercourse of kind”). Shelley’s comprehen-
sive analysis of mind anticipates and, if you will, anachronistically deepens 
one of the “dangerous” ideas hazarded by the philosopher Daniel Dennett 
(1995: 366): “We should note that the memes for normative concepts—
for ought and good and truth and beauty—are among the most entrenched 
denizens of our minds. Among the memes that constitute us, they play 
a central role. Our existence as us, as what we as thinkers are—not as 
what we as organisms are—is not independent of these memes.” Shelley’s 
analysis implies, however, that the line between biological organism and 
moral thinker, individual and society, gene and meme is neither sharp nor 
straight, but operationally elaborated according to the functional logos of 
analogy (“proportion”).
 This is an explanation not only of human cognitive development 
(including theory of mind) but of human cultural-historical development 
(leveraged upon theory of mind), both of which require and foster the 
“mutual dependence” of society. From this “seed” springs the “plant” of 
human destiny, whose irresistible growth Shelley traces in the artistic and 
political innovations of the ancient world, the emancipation of women 
a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is con-
ducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, and 
everything is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple manner. ’Tis necessary, therefore, 
to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general principles, upon which all 
our notions of morals are founded.” Shelley seems equally to have anticipated and fulfilled 
in advance Jackendoff ’s (2007: 187) admonition that the theorist of human sociomoral phe-
nomena “be prepared to discuss the questions openly and thoughtfully, bringing to bear our 
(hopefully) growing understanding of the sorts of cognitive entities moral codes are, of the 
role moral codes play in the functioning of a society, and of the innate underpinnings of the 
social understanding that helps shape moral codes in every culture.”
54. Thus, e.g., “Homer and the cyclical poets were followed at a certain interval by the 
dramatic and lyrical Poets of Athens, who flourished contemporaneously with all that is 
most perfect in the kindred expressions of the poetical faculty; architecture, painting, music, 
dance, sculpture, philosophy, and we may add, the forms of civil life” (Shelley 1965, 7:118); 
“the true poetry of Rome lived in its institutions; for whatever of beautiful, true, and majes-
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and abolition of slavery in the modern world, and perhaps at the far end 
of history, the equalization and amelioration (despite inevitable setbacks) 
of the human condition around the globe. Shelley’s radical theory (and 
hope) was that sociopolitical equality would turn out to be a deep-seated 
and self-fulfilling cognitive prophecy.
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